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Abstract. 
 
Globalisation and technology have resulted in an increase in international 
commerce, capital flows and the movement of goods and services across borders. 
Such factors have also increased opportunities to launder money and reintegrate the 
proceeds of crimes into the legitimate economy.  In response to such developments, 
as well to perceived threats to their national economies and tax-bases, the G7/G8 
and the OECD have created various International initiatives, to combat money-
laundering, which have targeted jurisdictions offering limited financial regulation, 
bank confidentiality and low levels of taxation. These initiatives, however suffer 
from a legitimacy gap, owing to the vertical unilaterality of the regimes they seek to 
institute. This work will attempt to examine the origins and purposes of the 
homogenising global anti-money laundering regime. It shall also examine its 
legitimacy and effectiveness, with emphasis on Offshore Financial Centres.  
    
.  
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"Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae." 
Marcus Tullius Cicero. 
 
 
"In medio stat virtus." 
Quintus Horatius Flaccus. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
The Crime of Money Laundering. Is money laundering a universal crime or 
secondary crime? 
 
 
Money laundering is the basis by which, the perpetrators of criminal or 
illegal acts seek to exert control over the proceeds of their activities without 
drawing attention to the underlying criminal acts 1.    In the UK and other common 
law jurisdictions as well in the EU 2  money laundering generally amounts to 
taking action with any form of property 3 , derivative of a criminal act that will 
disguise the fact that that property is the proceeds of a crime or obscure its 
beneficial ownership 4 . In other jurisdictions, such as the US money laundering is 
engaging in financial transactions to conceal the identity, source, or destination of 
illegally gained money, whereas in other cases the offence of ‘handling’ the 
proceeds of crime suffices to include money laundering 5 . It has been estimated 
that laundered monies account for between 2 and 5 percent of the world’s gross 
domestic product 6.   
                                                 
1 Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., Anti-Money Laundering Handbook. Sydney: Thomson Lawbook Co.  2008. Pg.4. 
 
2 As under the definition given under Art.1 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC money laundering is ‚the 
conversion or transfer of property derived from criminal activity for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such activity in evading the legal consequences of his action..‛.  
 
3 Including intangibles as under Art3(3)2005/60/EC. 
 
4 Under the Common Law, although this definition is extensively expanded upon under the Proceeds 
Of Crime Act 2002 Part 7 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
5 Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., Loc. Cit.  
6  Although the FATF-GAFI state that it is absolutely impossible to produce a reliable estimate of the 
amount of money laundered and therefore does not publish any figures in this regard. From FATF-
GAFI., Money Laundering FAQ 2010. 
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The motivations of the perpetrators of predicate offences 7  to present the 
money, as having been acquired otherwise than by crime are prima-facie founded 
in the possibility, that the illicitness of the proceeds, would link the authors of the 
offence, to the initial criminal act. The offenders must nevertheless bridge the gap 
between themselves and the rest of society to benefit from the proceeds of their 
offences and thus must present them as licit 8 . Other motivations include tax 
avoidance or evasion 9 and the avoidance of the seizure of criminal proceeds. 
 The motivations to illegalise money laundering are to target the 
profitability of predicate offences and those who render such activity profitable, 
rather than the person committing the predicate offence alone 10. This is thought to 
mitigate the overall adverse effects of the predicate offence and indirectly 
disincentivises and deters criminal activity 11 . 
                                                 
7 The primary offence by which the proceeds to be laundered are generated. Article 1(e) of the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) (Vienna 
Convention) limits predicate offences to drug trafficking offences. Article 2(2) of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (Palermo Convention) extends money 
laundering to the ‚the widest range of predicate offenses‛ as does the FATF in its 40 
Recommendations of 2003.  From  Schott. P.A Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism.Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006.Pg. I-3.  The scope of Predicate 
offences is also very wide under European law. Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA Art1(b) 
refers to offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more 
than one year as a minimum. 
 
8 Hinterseer.K., Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context. The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.11. 
9 A predicate offence in the UK and other common law jurisdictions. 
10 Ormerod.D.C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law. 12th Edition. Oxford University Press.2008. Pg.951. 
 
11 From Ormerod.D.C., Op. Cit. Pg.954. Also from the dicta of Lord Wolf CJ in R v Sekton [2003] 1WLR 
1655. Alldridge however states that the idea that prevention of the perpetrators from profiting from 
the predicate offence will deprive them of an incentive to commit it, is based on 18th century notions 
regarding the handling of stolen goods, created in situations where ‘the courts had foreclosed the 
natural avenue(s) of complicity that the new offence was created’.  Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal 
Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.  2000. Pg.170.  
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  Money laundering activities imply and necessitate interaction with the 
legitimate economy and thus have been described as the ‘Achilles heel’  12 of 
organised crime as although they expose criminals to the possibility of being 
caught, they are necessary for the continuation of their operations13.  From a 
regulatory point of view, an anti-money laundering infrastructure primarily 
allows authorities to confiscate the proceeds of predicate offences to which they 
would otherwise not have access to under normal market conditions14. 
Criminalising15 laundering techniques over and above the predicate offences 
provides a means for confiscating the proceeds as well as the ‘value’ such 
proceeds may have been converted into. Similarly this allows for money 
laundering as an offence to extend to persons other than the perpetrators of the 
predicate offence.  The Crown Prosecution Service in the UK 16  divides money 
laundering into ‘own proceeds’ where the perpetrator launders the proceeds of his 
own offending and secondly into laundering by a person other than principle 
offender. Both forms of laundering can be charged as secondary counts to the 
principal offence, or charged separately without the jury considering the principal 
                                                 
12 Froomkin.S.M., Offshore Centres and Money Laundering. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol.1 
No.2. 2007. Pg.167. 
13 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.86. 
 
14 Ibid. Pg.85. In the UK, in R v Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470-86 an appeal was allowed against the 
forfeiture of the proceeds of drug offences exposing the limitations in forfeiture laws. This led to 
Hodgson Committee 1984 inquiring into the vacuum created in the law by the Cuthbertson case and 
subsequently to the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986; the first UK statute to categorize money 
laundering as a criminal offence. 
 
15 Although recovery of laundered assets or the proceeds of crime is possible in civil law. In the UK 
under the Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. ss.240 to 288 it is possible to possible to recover property 
acquired though ‚unlawful conduct‛ without the need for a criminal conviction. This is parallel to the 
FATF’s Recommendation 2(b) where civil liability should be sought where criminal liability is 
unavailable and Recommendation 3 requiring Countries to consider adopting measures that allow 
such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction. Civil 
forfeiture is also possible in US law. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000). 
 
16 Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. s. 340(4).  
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offence17. The criminalisation of money laundering also provides a means for high 
level criminals to be brought to account, who though normally are not directly 
involved in the committal of predicate offences are nevertheless beneficiaries and 
exposed to the proceeds18.   
The common analysis 19 of money laundering generally comes from earlier 
ideas about the integration of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking 20 into the 
financial system, and although relevant is not necessarily ‚borne out in reality‛ 21 
This model breaks down into three stages; placement, layering and integration. 
The placement stage is the moving of the funds away from their source. This 
involves detracting from the illegal origins of the proceeds of the predicate 
offences, typically by use of bank deposits, currency smuggling or exchange, 
conversion to negotiable instruments etc., use of legitimate and front/shell 
business vehicles or through some compliant third party such as a banker, 
accountant or lawyer who ‘places’ the proceeds through use of their client 
accounts 22.   
Layering involves creating the semblance of legitimate financial activity by 
dividing the total sum and passing its constituent monies, through sets of complex 
                                                 
17 CPS Legal Guidance. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part7 - Money Laundering Offences. 2010. 
18 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.86. 
 
19 Schroth.P.W., Bank Confidentiality and the War on Money Laundering in the United States. In 
BLANCHIMENT D'ARGENT ET SECRET BANCAIRE. Paolo Bernasconi. 1996. Pg.290. This basic 
model accepted by the British CPS, the UN, FATF and other organisations and is reflected in UK law 
under Part 7 of the Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. 
 
20 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008. Pg.438 
 
21 Mwenda. K.K., Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering. Michigan State University 
Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.148. 
 
22 From Lilliey, P. Asian Money Laundering Explosion, Fighting Corruption in Asia - Causes, effects and 
remedies. Singapore: World Scientific Co. Ltd. 2003. 
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transactions. This has the purpose of disguising the source and ownership of the 
money as well as making detection of laundering activity through accounting and 
audit methods much harder 23. Money launderers are attracted to offshore 
financial centres (OFCs) during the layering stage, as it allows them to move 
money between jurisdictions with little impediment, as well as to receive money 
in their own jurisdiction from seemingly legitimate sources. OFCs reciprocally 
provide money launderers with confidentiality and bank privacy, limited 
withholding 24 and other taxes and lax corporate and financial supervision, as part 
of their attempts to attract money into their jurisdictions. Similarly OFCs provide 
adequate corporate and financial infrastructures to facilitate laundering 25.  
Integration of the laundered money, involves bringing it back into the 
normal economy, to be used as capital or for the purposes of consumption by the 
perpetrator of the predicate offence/money launderer. This may be achieved by a 
wide variety of methods such as the receipt of remuneration, as the officer of an 
OFC based front/shell business vehicle, the use of financial instruments 26   such 
as letters of credit, bonds, bank notes, bills of lading and guarantees to repatriate 
the money or using the resultant proceeds of real estate transactions, gambling, 
stock purchases or corporate loans etc. as the means of reintegration 27.  
The ‘three stages’ analysis model of infusing the proceeds of crime into the 
financial system is not necessarily the only money laundering model and not all 
predicate offences are detectable from their audit trail.  The yields from insider 
trading, undiscovered non-disclosures or false disclosures/misrepresentations in 
                                                 
23 Buchanan.B., Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: Combating Money Laundering in the Asia-
Pacific Region. Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 2005. Pgs.439-440. 
 
24 Whereby payers of certain amounts, especially interest, dividends, and royalties, to foreign payees 
withhold income tax from such payment and pay it to the government. 
25 FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010. 
26 Buchanan.B., Loc.Cit.  
27  From He.P., A typological study on money laundering.  Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol. 13 
No. 1, 2010.  
 
10 
 
  
R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. 
 
  
securities issues and other unjust enrichments or undue influence are normally 
easily integrated into the financial system without third-party payments, 
withdrawals or layering or placement activities28.  
 
 
Since 2001, regulators have increasingly associated money laundering with 
terrorist financing.  Even prior to 9/11 29 law enforcement agencies were equating 
the threat from organised crime with terrorism30. The United States had already 
announced the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre (FTATC) a 
year before 9/11 31 and in 2002 the US Department of the Treasury  followed by 
describing terrorist financing as a part of money laundering 32. The United 
Nations in 1999, addressed terrorist financing in the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and followed in 2001 adopting 
Resolutions 1267 and 1333 to sanction suspected perpetrators of terrorist events 33. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) prior to 9/11 acknowledged the lack of 
consensus regarding the relationship between terrorist finance and money 
laundering but following 9/11 adopted nine special recommendations to provide 
                                                 
28 Mwenda. K.K., Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering. Michigan State University 
Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.148. Also see Stessens.G., Money 
laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.83. 
 
29  Describing the terrorist events perpetrated in New York on the 11th of September 2001.  
30 Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.  2000. Pg.171.  
 
31 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.253. 
 
32 The 2002 Strategy seeks to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to 
impair the ability of terrorists to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the financial 
networks of terrorists. From US Department of the Treasury: The 2002 National Money Laundering 
Strategy. 4. 2002. 
 
33 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.253. 
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international standards for specifically combating terrorist financing as part of its 
overall anti-money laundering framework 34. Currently the link between terrorist 
finance and money laundering is generally well established and the former is 
thought to be a specialised form of the latter.  
Commentators 35 drawing parallels between terrorist finance and money 
laundering refer to a process known as ‘money dirtying’. This is the process of 
concealment for the purposes of separating channelled funds from their 
destination to enable acts of terrorism, where the flows of funds across borders, 
increases the probability that the terrorism will be discovered 36. In effect, this 
suggests that terrorist financing is the reverse of money laundering. Funds, rather 
than originating as outputs from predicate offences, are following a layering 
process, ultimately employed as inputs for the purposes of committing a criminal 
offence 37. In recent terrorist events, such processes took the form of avoidance of 
internet communications and bookkeeping systems and reliance on informal 
alternative remittance systems 38.   The perpetrator in the case of terrorist financing 
requires anonymity to avoid criminal responsibility and to protect his ability to 
engage in the same activity subsequently 39.   
                                                 
34 FATF-GAFI: 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF). 2004. 
35 Such as Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi 
University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007, Compin.F., The role of accounting in money laundering and 
money dirtying. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008 and Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., 
Anti-Money Laundering Handbook. Sydney: Thomson Lawbook Co.  2008.  
 
36 Masciandaro. D., Op.Cit. Pg. 22.  
37 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit. Pg. 309. 
 
38 An informal (often oral) banker's draft, used in transmitting currency from one country to another 
employing extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. It makes 
minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Compin.F., The role of accounting in money 
laundering and money dirtying. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Pg.599. 
Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of 
Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.335. 
 
39 Cuéllar. M.F., Op.Cit. Pg. 334.  
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 The central idea behind equating terrorist finance with money laundering 
comes from the anglo-centric 40 notion that crime prevention relates to the 
containment of subsequent criminal activity through exerting control over the 
finances and proceeds of criminal activities 41.  The only anti-money laundering 
mechanisms, which would be pertinent to anti-terror initiatives would  invariably 
be preventative diligence alerting to the possibility of a terrorist event, such as 
identifying the perpetrator 42. Even these however are likely to have little effect if 
the funds are legitimate in origin. This is exacerbated by the fact that the amounts 
employed in money dirtying operations are insignificant compared to those dealt 
with in narcotic and other laundering offences 43. Terrorists and indeed criminal 
financiers of any kind, do not seek to directly enjoy the gains of their activities in 
the same manner that money launderers might. As a result money dirtying 
operations do not require the reintegration of funds into the mainstream financial 
system as such, except for the perpetration of the ultimate criminal event.  Yet 
again the amounts in question detract from the likelihood of detection. 
                                                 
40 This may possibly be owing to the fact that jurisdictions such as Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands etc. have normally not accepted an extraterritorial jurisdiction over attempts or other 
inchoate offences, which do not have ‚effects‛ (discussed below) in their jurisdiction unlike the US 
and the UK.  Wolswijk.H.D., Locus Delicti and Criminal Jurisdiction. Netherlands International Law 
Review (1999), 46:361-382 Cambridge University Press.1999. Pgs. 270-276. Notably though,  
knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element money laundering offences may be inferred 
from objective factual circumstances under Article 1(5) of Directive 2005/60/EC.  
 
41 Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.  2000. Pg.170. 
Cuéllar. M.F., Op.Cit. Pg. 381. 
 
42 Such as the ‚Know Your Customer‛ requirements, ascertaining customer identify, typically through 
comparisons with lists of known offenders. See Financial Services Authority. Reducing money 
laundering risk - Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering monitoring. DP22. 2003.    
43 Compin.F., The role of accounting in money laundering and money dirtying. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Pgs. 599-600. Also see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States. 2004.  
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Unlike money laundering terrorist financing is far less financially 
sophisticated and can be sourced from both legal and illegal activities 44. The 9/11 
Commission identifies the use of legitimate charitable organisations and NGOs as 
the primary source of terror financing,45 whilst other commentators point towards 
legitimate businesses and criminal activities 46. Terrorist financiers, nevertheless 
irrespective of the source of funds, unlike money launderers have the advantage 
of not requiring to place the money in question as such, and their deposits can, at 
least on the face it, have a bona-fide commercial or personal reason.  Similarly 
money dirtying enjoys the lack of an immediate financial victim who has an 
incentive to report 47.For such reasons, and generally low success rates 48, contrary 
to the view of the FATF 49  money laundering and money dirtying operations are 
thought not to be closely related and it seems unclear whether anti-money 
laundering or the private sector are the appropriate fora for dealing with terrorist 
finance 50.  
                                                 
44 Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption 
of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.318. 
45 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Op.Cit. Pg.171.  
46 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.276. Such sources of funds were not used for the purposes of 
9/11.  
47 Cuéllar. M.F., Op.Cit. Pg.335. 
48 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit. Pg.312. 
49 Prior to 9/11 the FATF had agreed that terror finance should not be included in the anti-money 
laundering framework. This was supported by FinCEN (the US Financial Intelligence Unit) who post 
9/11 showed that anti-money laundering tools can not spot the financing of terrorism. Tsingou.E., 
Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.13. 
 
50  A view supported in Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. 
Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Compin.F., The role of accounting in money laundering and money 
dirtying. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous 
Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Levi.M.,Combating the financing of terrorism: a 
history and assessment of the control of "threat finance". British Journal of Criminology. 2010.  and 
Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global 
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Tax evasion is generally a predicate offence 51.  For the purposes of 
laundering, money launderers shall trade-off the full returns 52 normally expected 
from the proceeds of the predicate offence, for avoidance of the risk of seizure and 
confidentiality. In other words they pay for confidentiality by accepting a non-
risk adverse investment position or alternatively lower yields 53. Money 
launderers would thus be attracted by low tax rates that jurisdictions, other than 
those where the tax is due, may provide in order to offset the return to risk-
confidentiality trade-off. Similarly the institution of taxation requires an 
attachment of the state to the financial affairs of the individual, which is 
undesirable for the purposes of predicate offenders 54. Laxity of tax liability in 
OFCs (or in this contest tax-havens) makes them attractive to money launderers. 
They realise more than they would in other circumstances with little lost to tax.  
In a wider context, OFCs/tax-havens through strict banking secrecy, opaque 
corporate requirements, limited information exchanges and low taxation 
requirements provide tax avoidance opportunities for investors and make 
themselves attractive to high net worth individuals and multi-national 
                                                                                                                                                        
Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. 
Pg.13. 
 
51 Such as in the UK, under ss2,3,4,etc. of the Fraud Act 2006, or ‘Cheating the public revenue’ in the 
common law etc. In the US similarly under s. 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), it is a federal 
crime for anyone to wilfully attempt to evade or defeat the payment of federal income taxes. It is 
probable that in countries where the scope of predicate offences extends to ‚the widest range‛,  tax 
evasion is a predicate offence for the purposes of money laundering.  
 
52 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.18. 
53 Mullineux. A.W. & Murinde.V., Handbook of international banking. Elgar Original Reference Series. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003. Pg.553. 
 
54 Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.28. 
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corporations. Offshore jurisdictions, in order to attract investment, therefore 
institute, nominally effective or no taxation on corporate activities, dividend 
payments, capital gains, inheritance, gifts or other large transfers 55.Such 
jurisdictions also ‘ring-fence’ their domestic taxation regime to exclude only non-
resident investors from revenue collection, whilst denying them access to local 
markets56.  This approach identifies how such jurisdictions are seeking to attract 
passive investment activity 57 from geographically mobile financial services 
providers or companies seeking to relocate to benefit from taxation    
Corporations with multinational operations, based in high tax jurisdictions, 
in turn seek to allocate large proportions of their taxable income to OFCs/tax-
havens in order to avoid the taxation of their foreign income by their home 
country 58. They achieve this through processes such as ‘offshoring’ financial 
services and other operations 59 or ‘corporate inversion’ i.e. converting an offshore 
subsidiary into the parent company, whilst maintaining manufacturing 
infrastructure (if any) in the original home state etc. 60 Such trends detract from the 
interests of the home countries of multinational companies, whose infrastructure 
and financial depth is employed to develop the multinational’s businesses, but 
are unable to benefit from revenue and tax that they may collect from the 
multinational.  Since all corporations and economic actors, in a jurisdiction do not 
have access to extra-jurisdictional tax avoidance opportunities, and the parties that 
do are motivated by revenue protection rather than economic efficiency, provision 
                                                 
55 OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998. Paras.52-56. 
56 Ibid. Para.62.  
57  Which do not relate to any bonafide commercial or industrial activity.  
58 Desai.M.A. et al The demand for tax haven operations, Journal of Public Economics 2006, (513) 515. 
2006. Pg.513.  
 
59 Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.42. 
60 Ibid .Pg.92. 
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of tax evasion/avoidance facilities by OFCs/tax-havens can create significant 
market and competition distortions 61.  
Tax evasion is detrimental to the jurisdiction where taxable revenues are 
generated as money laundering is to the jurisdiction where the predicate offence 
was committed.  Although pursuit of tax evaders in criminal law is possible, it is 
not entirely possible or desirable by states to prevent the international movement 
of corporations in order to protect their tax base.  
 
 
  Using a conservative definition of money laundering, this offence generally 
arises, where the proceeds of underlying ‘predicate offences’ are sought to be 
integrated into the mainstream financial system. Money laundering can be seen as 
a secondary crime entirely dependent on the existence of the predicate offence as 
conceivably, activities, which would become criminal subsequent to the predicate 
offence, would not be so otherwise.  
Activities akin to those of money laundering 62  are not objectionable 
behaviour unto themselves but become so as part of wider criminal or illegal 
activities 63. This position is apparent in English law as in R v Louis Everson and 
others followed by R v Greaves and others 64  where the Court of Appeal accepted 
                                                 
61 From Craig.W.Y., & Kumar,A., Tax Harmonisations for Europe and the world: could the ECJ show the 
way, , I.C.C.L.R., 2007, 18(10), 341-348,  Kluwer Law International, 2003.  
 
62  Such as ‘deep discounting’ by supermarkets, achieved by large cross-border flows of goods and 
funds to minimise the retail price of the goods.  
63 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.85. Mitsilegas.V., 
Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: a new paradigm of security governance versus 
fundamental legal principles. Volume. 20 of European business law & practice series. European law 
library. Kluwer Law International, 2003. Pg.33. 
 
64 R. v Greaves (Claude Clifford), R. v Botcher (Henrik), R. v Jenkins (Fraser) [2010] EWCA Crim 709; [2010] 
Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 423. 
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that the primary crime differed from the money laundering offence for the 
purposes of sentencing 65.   
It would follow that many activities of money launderers would not be 
illegal but for the illegality of predicate offence. This is demonstrable from the 
UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, under which the prosecution must show that the 
laundered proceeds are ‘criminal property’ resultant of conduct, which constitutes 
an offence in the UK 66.  This means that revenues generated from any criminal 
conduct, which is an offence in the UK but not in other jurisdictions, and remitted 
back to the UK would be subject to a reporting obligation under the 2002 Act or to 
UK anti-money laundering laws.   
Creating the separate primary crime of money laundering relates largely to 
the possibility that money laundering may not be conducted in the same 
jurisdiction as the predicate offence. This possibility, in turn allows the 
perpetrators of predicate offences to enjoy the proceeds of their activities, within 
the jurisdiction where the predicate offences were committed, particularly where 
the launderers are unconnected third parties 67. Whilst the proceeds of predicate 
offences, within a jurisdiction can adequately become subject to handling 
offences or forfeiture laws, this may not be true if the proceeds are moved 
elsewhere. The recipient jurisdiction may be uncooperative or suffer from 
regulatory laxity or employ deliberate financial opaqueness or secrecy, making 
the proceeds of crime harder to recover 68. The ‘effects doctrine’ 69 has been 
                                                 
65 R. v Louis Everson, Kamalesh Soneji, David Bullen [2001] EWCA Crim 2262 2001 WL 1346987 
66 As under s.340 of Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. This position is mirrored by Art.3(3) of Directive.  
2005/60/EC. 
67  Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. s.340(4).  
68 Such as non recognition of the predicate offences as was the case with  the Seychelles in 1995, where 
the government seeking inward investment enacted the Economic Development Act,  whereby  those 
investing US$10million or more were able to claim immunity from prosecution for criminal offences 
and security from possible seizure of their assets, as long as they did not commit serious crime in the 
Seychelles. This ‚money launderers’ charter‛ was repealed following FATF pressure. Fisher.H.,FATF 
Lifts its Warning about Investment Law in Seychelles. OECD/FATF-GAFI Oct. 2000. 
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entrenched into US law for the purposes of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(f), where the perpetrator is a US citizen or a non-US citizen operating in the 
US 70. This position is also reflected in Article.1(3) of Directive 2005/60/EC 71  
whereby money laundering is regarded as such, even where the activities were 
conducted in a third country. Although, potentially foreign corporate crimes may 
be addressed by the nationality principle 72, e.g. in cases of the use of subsidiaries 
in lax jurisdictions to launder money or ideas of effects, protection73, or passive 
personality 74, the effectiveness of such extraterritoriality is questionable.  Such 
bases tend to lack a sound, legislative or theoretical base and are unlikely to 
succeed 75 (short of sanctions or conflict) if the jurisdiction, where the actual 
laundering is taking place is uncooperative or has a vested interest in laundering 
offences 76. It is for such reasons that FATF and other international efforts, must 
                                                                                                                                                        
69 Applicable in European and American competition cases where domestic competition laws are 
applicable to foreign undertakings and  domestic undertakings located outside domestic jurisdiction 
where their transactions produce an "effect" within the domestic jurisdiction T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v 
Commission, (1999) E.C.R., page II-0753, at paras. 89-92.  Use of the effects doctrine in a money 
laundering case was highlighted in United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.Fla.1990). 
 
70 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.221. 
71 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
72 The nationality principle recognizes that a sovereign can adopt criminal laws which govern the 
conduct of the sovereign’s nationals while outside of the sovereign’s borders.  Under this principle, 
for example, a sovereign can make it a crime for its nationals to engage in sexual relations with 
minors while outside of its borders or to pay bribes outside of its borders to public officials of another 
sovereign.  
73 The protective principle emphasizes the actual or possible effects of an offense and provides for 
jurisdiction over conduct deemed harmful to specific national interests of the forum state. 
74 The passive personalty principle recognizes that a sovereign can adopt laws that apply to conduct 
of foreign nationals who commit crimes against the sovereign’s nationals while the sovereign’s 
nationals are outside of the sovereign’s territory, as in United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 
(S.D.Fla.1990). 
75 From Felkenes. G.T., Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Its impact on criminal justice. Journal of 
Criminal Justice. Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 583-594, 1993. 
76 Although it may be unfeasible or impractical to extend an extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
offence of money laundering, under International criminal law (Article 6(2)(c) of the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime) predicate offences for the purposes of establishing liability 
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rely on bolstering and homogenising the legal and regulatory framework of other 
jurisdictions, which seemingly are the only vehicle to adversely affect the 
laundering of the proceeds of predicate offences. The FATF’s first 
recommendation is thus to to criminalise money laundering separately to 
predicate offences77. The offence of money laundering may be a secondary crime, 
akin to handling offences for domestic purposes but must be constructed as a 
primary, universal crime in order to make anti-money laundering efforts effective 
globally.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
under the money laundering provisions may take  either inside or outside the jurisdiction of the 
regulating state. In the latter case it may only be treated as a predicate offence for the purpose of 
money laundering laws if the behavior constitutes a criminal offence in both states. 
 
77 FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
Offshore Centres and the Effects of Money Laundering. 
 
OFCs are jurisdictions that attract and oversee a disproportionate level of 
non-resident financial activity,78 with their financial sectors accounting for an 
inordinate part of their economy. They may represent developing countries or 
emerging economies; described as ‘low capacity’ countries by the FATF, 79 which 
exclusively by merits of their legislative competence seek to attract foreign 
investments. Developed jurisdictions such as Luxembourg or the City of London 
also exhibit offshore characteristics 80. The infrastructure of OFCs generally 
includes investor incentives such as low taxes, no ,81 light and flexible 
incorporation, lax licensing and supervisory regimes, flexible use of trusts and 
SPVs and high levels of confidentiality.  OFCs typically do not offer such 
incentives to domestic investors or residents with a view to attract foreign 
investment,82 and require a degree of financial framework as well as access to 
onshore financial markets. The traditional OFCs account for between 3 and 4 
percent of the World’s GPD and manage up to a quarter of the World’s assets 83.  
                                                 
78 Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M.,Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts? The Economic Journal, 117 
(October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007. Pg.1310. 
 
79  FATF-GAFI: The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in low capacity countries. 21st 
Aug 2009. 
80 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Pg.2. 
81 See Footnote 24. 
82 Financial Stability Forum., Report of the Working Group on Offshore Financial Centres. 2000. Pgs.9-10. 
83  Levin. M., Op.Cit. Pg.i.  
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OFCs generally also have the characteristics of tax-havens, which have the 
result of attracting corporate migrations or high net worth individuals.84 Tax-
havens however are not necessarily money laundering centres in every event.85 
The OECD test for a tax haven is ‚no or only nominal tax on …income‛ 86. The 
OECD further distinguishes ‘Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes’ as jurisdictions, 
which although collecting revenue, allow preferential treatment to result in low or 
no taxation, for certain kinds of income 87. Jurisdictions, which only have rates of 
taxation lower than other countries, yet collect ‘significant’ revenues are not tax-
havens or Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes, under the OECD guidance 88. The 
OECD describe tax competition 89, to at worst be a ‚race to the bottom‛, 90 which is 
the idea that fiscal measures taken by jurisdictions to attract investments creates a 
downward spiral in tax revenues, and a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ rivalry between 
competing countries 91. Any advantages gained are offset by competitors, 
compelling the further creation of tax advantages 92. In a wider context, capital 
flight and erosion of the tax base of onshore jurisdictions, incentivised by tax 
                                                 
84  Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Pg.2. 
85 Following from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) distinction 
and According to US Security Agencies. From Mitchell, D `US Government agencies confirm that low tax 
jurisdictions are not money-laundering havens' (2004) 11 J. of Financial Crime 127.  In Alldridge.P., Money 
Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.  
86 OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998. Pg.19. 
87 Ibid.Pg.20 
88 Ibid.Pg.19. 
 
89 Tax competition; a form of regulatory competition, exists when governments are encouraged to 
lower fiscal burdens to either encourage the inflow of productive resources or discourage the exodus 
of those resources. Often, this means a governmental strategy of attracting foreign direct investment, 
foreign indirect investment (financial investment), and high value human resources by minimizing 
the overall taxation level and/or special tax preferences, creating a comparative advantage. 
 
90 OECD Report., Op.Cit. Pgs.19-20. 
91 Gurtner.B., The Race to the Bottom. Incentives for New Investment? Tax Justice Network. Oct 15th to 
17th, 2008. 
92 Ibid.  
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opportunities offshore, is thought to result in increased unemployment onshore, 93 
as well as shifting tax burdens from capital to labour 94. Other commentators 95 
point towards the lack of empirical evidence, as tax revenues globally generally 
remain stable, with little movement from the taxation of capital to the taxation of 
labour, often cited in the relevant literature 96.  
OFCs are often portrayed as laundering centres, particularly by the various 
multilateral or international organizations, particularly the FATF and OECD, 
owing to perceived laxities in reporting, transparency and taxation.  The UN for 
instance suggests that the common feature of ‘all’ OFCs is that criminal 
organisations make use of the opportunities, such financial centres provide in 
order to launder money and thus impede law enforcement agencies.97 Money 
launderers are attracted to OFCs to offset losses they would incur onshore though 
risk-confidentiality trade-offs. Within the layering and integration phases, money 
launderers often rely on OFCs which can provide adequate corporate, financial or 
business infrastructure yet simultaneously provide limited anti-money 
laundering protections.  It has been suggested that the increased confidentiality 
offshore shall increase the demand for bank deposits which in turn shall increase 
an OFC bank’s loanable funds and reduce its interest rate, 98 which is why OFCs 
themselves have an interest in attracting the proceeds of predicate offences.  
 
                                                 
93 Huffington.A., Offshore Corporate Tax Havens: Why Are They Still Allowed? Global Policy Forum. 
June 1 2010. 
94 Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table 
(2001), 359 (199–212). Pg.207.  
 
95 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Pg.1. 
96 Ibid. 
97 From United Nations., UN Global Program against Money Laundering. 
98 Mullineux. A.W. & Murinde.V., Handbook of international banking. Elgar Original Reference Series. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003. Pgs. 560-562.   Also see Footnote. 53.  
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The FATF suggests that regulatory laxity by developing countries and 
OFCs attracts the deposit of the proceeds of crime to be re-integrated into the 
global financial system. Countries, which source the proceeds (i.e suffer the 
predicate offence) are exposed to detriment to their economies and financial 
systems and also bear the costs of any subsequent criminal activity, derivative of 
the reintegration of criminal money. The FATF and commentators 99 suggest that 
for such reasons global harmonisation of anti-money laundering legislation is 
imperative to achieve any success in the fight against money laundering. This 
shall have the effect of ‘levelling the playing field’ and preventing regulatory 
arbitrage at the expense of jurisdictions, which have enacted stricter anti-money 
laundering regimens.  
Money laundering, amongst other financial crimes is thought to 
systemically threaten banking 100  and economic stability internationally 101.  It 
results in the misallocation of resources towards socially disruptive, criminal and 
non-productive activities 102  rather than towards legitimate investments and 
                                                 
99 Such as Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies 
in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Also Schott. P.A, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism.Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. 
 
100 The Basel Committee holds that public confidence in Banks is undermined by inadvertent 
association with criminals as well as exposure to undesirable customers, who simply by association 
with the Banks’ officers can corrupt them. From Mitsilegas.V., Money Laundering Counter-Measures in 
the European Union: a new paradigm of security governance versus fundamental legal principles. Volume. 20 
of European business law & practice series. European law library. Kluwer Law International, 2003. 
V.33. 
 
101 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.31. 
102 The UK CPS, the UN, FATF etc. identify the illegal arms and drugs trade, people trafficking, 
prostitution and other organised criminal activities, a general lack of transparency and economic and 
political corruption, the disintegration of financial and governance systems,  the distortion state 
revenues and misallocation of resources, competition problems and  financing of terrorist activities as 
direct consequences of money laundering.  
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potentiates further criminal activity 103. It also corrupts financial markets and 
generally lowers public confidence in the International financial system 104. 
Money laundering results in the distortion of the corporate governance structures 
of financial institutions both internationally and in money laundering 
jurisdictions, as well as the loss of government revenues, where tax evasion is the 
motivating factor to launder money 105.  
Commentators 106 suggest that money laundering has particularly adverse 
effects upon developing economies, including tax havens and OFCs. A 
jurisdiction, which identifies as a haven for money laundering shall see increases 
in corruption 107 and crime, particularly in the form of bribery to facilitate money 
laundering efforts as well as a loss of confidence in its financial sector 108. 
Financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, operating in high risk 
                                                 
103 Commentators have sought to demonstrate that money laundering acts as a multiplier of the 
volume of the economic endowments that concerns to criminal and illegal agents. Masciandaro. D., 
Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 
171.2. 2007.  This is a view supported by the FATF who maintain that ‚<money laundering is 
inextricably linked to the underlying criminal activity that generated it. Laundering enables criminal 
activity to continue.‛ (FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010.) as well as the World Bank and IMF . 
Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.  II-2 
 
104 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.87. 
105 Mwenda. K.K., Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering. Michigan State University 
Journal of Business and Securities Law.  (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149. 
 
106  Such as Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Also 
Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
107 Including lawyers and bankers,  seeking to reduce estimations of the extent of money laundering, 
so as to dilute anti-money laundering measures.  Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law 
enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. Pg.87. 
108 Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. PgII-3 
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jurisdictions shall in turn be exposed to the markdown or devaluation of their 
assets, as well as difficulties in raising legitimate capital owing to increases in 
operational and reputational risks 109 Foreign financial institutions may limit or 
end relationships with high risk jurisdictions or impose extra costs or scrutiny, 
reducing access of legitimate businesses, in such jurisdictions to foreign capital 
markets 110.   This subsequently can weaken legitimate businesses and reduce the 
value of the mainstream economy, particularly where front/shell companies can 
cross-subsidize their activities, with illicit funds at the expense of domestic 
competitors 111. Foreign development aid or foreign private investments are also 
likely to be very limited for high risk jurisdictions 112.  
The large amounts of money involved in money laundering activities, 
rapidly entering and exiting the market can result in an increase in concentration 
risk, particularly for emerging economies, as loans are not rationally distributed 113 
with excessive credit or loan exposure to individual borrowers. Deposits from 
money launderers cannot be employed adequately as bank funding as they are 
subject to unanticipated withdrawals, which thus causes liquidity problems for 
the financial institution in question 114. As launderers seek confidentiality rather 
than yields and higher rates of return, money laundering distorts foreign 
exchange and interest rates, particularly where the amounts involved are globally 
significant 115.  Other costs of money laundering activities to developing 
economies can include asset seizures, legal risks and the costs of increased 
                                                 
109 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.31. 
110 Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund., Loc.Cit.  
111 Ibid. Pg. II-6.   Also in Mwenda. K.K., Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering. 
Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law.  (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149. 
112 Ibid. Pg. II-3. 
113 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Loc.Cit. 
114 Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund., Op.Cit. Pg.II-5. 
115 Mwenda. K.K., Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering. Michigan State University 
Journal of Business and Securities Law.  (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149. 
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regulation and intervention as well as those of penalties and fines. Such 
developments create a symbiosis between jurisdictions with offshore 
infrastructures and the illicit economy. Laundering incentivises and necessitates 
the influx of illegitimate funds to sustain the markets of jurisdictions, which 
facilitate money laundering activities, by requiring affirmation of its reputation of 
regulatory laxity 116. This, thus makes the jurisdiction more reliant on the proceeds 
of criminal and other illegitimate activities. The FATF similarly suggest that given 
that launderers rely on jurisdictional arbitrage; failures by developing countries to 
reduce differences between theirs and more robust anti-money laundering 
systems shall entrench organised crime 117.  
 
                                                 
116 Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi University 
Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg.381. 
 
117 FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010. 
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Figure 1: The Entrenchment of Money Laundering 
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In contrast to the FATF model, commentators 118  suggest that relationship 
between onshore and offshore financial centres, is a trade-off between positive 
and negative externalities, where although they facilitate money laundering and 
tax evasion by lowering costs, they also offer benefits, in terms of competitive 
pressure on onshore banks and jeopardise onshore banking oligopolies, causing 
them to modify their behaviour 119.   Legitimate offshore activities allow 
International companies to maximise profits and operating performance, issue 
securitised products flexibly and protect their assets from claimants 120. For such 
reasons large multinational corporations such as Apple Computers Inc., General 
Motors and Swatch A.G. amongst others, all have a historical and consistent track-
record of operating through OFCs, with a view to avail corporate flexibility and 
tax benefits that OFC’s provide 121.  
A symbiosis 122 between onshore and offshore may be argued to exist, as 
OFCs do not operate in an economic vacuum, independent of external economic 
structures 123. Onshore patronage of OFCs, is the result of the demand for respite, 
from inhospitable tax regimes and the inability to efficiently invest domestically 
(such as was the case with the petro-dollar surplus of the 1960s). Growth of 
onshore banks and multinationals over the past few decades is directly linked to 
the ability of such organisations to profit maximise offshore. OFC’s also focus on 
developing liquidity and are at the avant-garde of the use of electronic commerce 
                                                 
118 Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M.,Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts? The Economic Journal, 117 
(October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007. Pgs. 1312-21. Also see. Persaud.B., OECD Curbs 
on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). 
 
119  Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., Op.Cit. Pg. 1329. 
120  Persaud.B., Op.Cit. Pg. 205. 
121 Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pgs. 49-
51.  
122  Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., Op.Cit. Pg. 1329. 
123 Donaghy.M & Clarke.M., Are offshore financial centres the product of global markets? A sociological 
response. Economy and Society, 32: 3, 381 — 409. 2003. Pg.390 
 
29 
 
  
R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. 
 
  
and financial innovation. Other products such as insurance and re-insurance, fund 
and trust management, hedging and shipping are all constituents of legitimate 
industries, which OFC’s can efficiently provide as ancillaries to their financial 
markets 124. The existence of OFCs with adequate anti-money laundering 
infrastructure such as Jersey and other Crown dependencies 125 begs the question 
as to whether international concern over money laundering, is at least partially 
based on revenues losses through the leniency of OFC tax regimes.    
An alternative view comes from commentators 126 who argue that there is 
sparse evidence as to the impact of money laundering on International growth and 
development at all.  The primary drivers to internationally criminalise money 
laundering come from an attempted conflation of International development with 
good global governance 127. Notably earlier ideas originating from the OECD, 
prior to the inception of the FATF, considering the economic effects of money 
laundering, in a given national economy gave far greater significance to the 
laundering offence rather than the predicate offence 128 . 
                                                 
124  Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round 
Table (2001), 359 (199–212). Pgs. 205-207.  
125  From Rosdol.A., "Are OFCs leading the fight against money laundering?", Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol. 10 Iss: 3, pp.337 – 351. 2007.  
 
126  Such as Hülsse. R.,Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering 
Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers. April, 2007. Tsingou.E., Global 
Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money 
Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Williams.D., 
Governance, Security and ‘Development”: The Case of Money Laundering. City University Working Papers 
on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. February 2008. 
127  Williams.D., Op.Cit. Pg.2.  In 2009-2010 approximately 42% of the World Bank’s resources were 
dedicated  to the creation of governance systems in member countries reflecting international 
standards of good conduct; governance-enhancing and anti-corruption initiatives including  anti-
corruption measures, public services and judiciary reforms, tax and administration policies, 
decentralisation, and public services supply. 
128  From Hinterseer.K., An economic analysis of Money Laundering. Journal of Money Laundering 
Control. 1. 1997. 
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 The harm to developing countries, identified by proponents of a 
homogenised anti-money laundering regime does not adequately account for the 
benefits to such countries from the attracted investment. Becoming an OFC may 
be seen as a rational development strategy for smaller states. In effect such states 
attract investment and expertise and improve local employment and wages 129, by 
offering global financial markets, multinational companies and investors,  an 
investment avenue, with lower tax, fiscal and judicial risks. This may be 
particularly useful where, as is the case with small island nations there are limited 
resources and few opportunities, 130 or where nations are underdeveloped for lack 
of infrastructure and thus need to incentivise foreign investment. 
 It has been suggested that a motivator against the influx of business to 
developing countries is against the interests of developed economies 131. Money 
laundering ‚in and of itself‛ per empirical evidence 132 does not have substantial 
negative repercussions for an economy, and furthermore laundering reintegrates 
at least portions of untaxed funds from the illegitimate to the legitimate economy 
producing wealth and revenue 133.  
Arguably the illegalisation of the proceeds of crime is the result of a failure 
in the criminal law to address the committal of predicate offences. Similarly the 
investment of the proceeds of crime into legitimate businesses or other unlawful 
investments does not detract from the mischief in the predicate offence 134. The 
                                                 
129 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. 
Pg.4.   
130  Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Chapters 
1 and 2. Describing the situation in the Cayman Islands.  
 
131  Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008. Pg.447. 
132  Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.304. 
133 Ibid. 
134  Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008. Pg.451. 
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idea that international money laundering potentiates or acts as a multiplier for 
further criminal activity is also largely unfounded.  It seems in this case that ‚the 
crucial hypothesis (being made) is that both legal and illegal investment (at least 
part of the latter) need to be financed by ‘clean’ liquidity‛ 135 . It is more likely that 
the proceeds of criminal activity are employed locally within a jurisdiction to 
further criminal purposes, in the case of more minor criminal activity 136 and is a 
problem more pertinently addressed by municipal laws dealing with receipt, 
handling or dealing with stolen goods 137 rather than top heavy anti-money 
laundering  laws. Commentators have for such reasons described the UK Proceeds 
Of Crime Act 2002, which itself develops from handling offences as ‘draconian’ 138  
as the mens-rea for laundering offences is diminished to mere suspicion 139 or 
objective tests of fault with no requirement to prove dishonesty, as under the 
                                                 
135  Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation. European Journal of Law and 
Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.227. 
 
136  ‚..money laundering, in a ‘given economy’ with legal and illegal sectors, can play the role of 
multiplier‛ *Emphasis added+. From Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo 
Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg.2. 
 
137  For example in the UK there is a clear relationship between the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 dealing 
with money laundering and earlier handling offences. Under s. 22 of the Theft Act 1968  handling 
stolen goods is an alternative charge to theft, where a person handles stolen goods if knowing or 
believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or 
assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if 
he arranges to do so. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ss. 327 to 329 offences are generally quite similar. 
The 2002 Act like the Theft Act maintains the idea of equity’s darling; the bona fide purchaser (From 
Shaw.N., Tax and the Proceeds of Crime. GITC Review VolII.No.2. 2003). and  s.4 of the Theft Act 1968 
defines property is generally parallel to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 definition of ‚criminal 
property‛ including money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and 
other intangible property with the exclusion of real estate unless stolen in the capacity of a trustee, 
personal representative or attorney etc.  
 
138  The increased draconianism of the Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002 has been argued to result from the 
increased threat of money laundering. (Millington.T. & Williams .M.K., The Proceeds of Crime, Law and 
Practice of Restraint, Confiscation, Condemnation and Forfeiture. 2nd  Edition. Oxford University Press. 
2007.  Pg.9.) Alternatively in R (on the application of Wilkinson v DPP) [2006] EWHC 3012 (Admin) and 
R v Whitham [2008] EWCA Crim 239 the High Court and the Court of Appeal respectively accepted 
that handling should be charged rather than money laundering in less serious cases, but also 
maintained that the court could not cause the prosecution not to charge under POCA 2002.  
 
139 R v. Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654. 
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Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978.  Subsequent criminal activity does not required 
laundered or integrated funds in order to occur, however the  Proceeds Of Crime 
Act 2002 allows for prosecution without conviction for the predicate offence 140. 
The criminalisation of money laundering, in fact incites criminals to yet more 
surreptitious means to hide and reintegrate the proceeds and creates a secondary 
criminal industry to do so 141. Local decriminalisation of more minor predicate 
offences or more effective mechanisms to address them 142, may in fact be more 
effective and efficient than attempting to institute a homogenous  global anti-
money laundering regime.  
The primary drivers behind an increased interest in International money 
laundering are the ‘problemisation’143 and ‘securitisation’ of failures in 
governance in developing countries, which are perceived to be threat (if only 
potentially) to developed nations following the events of 9/11 in 2001, with a view 
to integrate developing countries into harmonised and standardised international 
                                                 
140  R v. Sabaharwal [2001] 2 Cr App R (S) 81. 
 
141  Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.298.  
142 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008. Pg.451.  
 
143  Williams.D cites the works; Buzan.B, Waever.O and de Wilde.J Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.Co. 1998. Waever,O., ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, In 
Lipschutz.R., (ed.), On Security. Columbia University Press,1995, and   Waever.O., Buzan.B.,  
Kelstrup.M., & Lemaitre.P., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1993. etc.  known as the ‚Copenhagen School‛ the work of which has been 
subject to some controversy. ‚Securitization< involves an investigation into the ways in which 
issues, processes and events become seen as matters of ‘security’, and thus cast as existential threats 
that require special measures to address‛. (From Williams.D., Governance, Security and ‘Development”: 
The Case of Money Laundering. City University Working Papers on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. 
February 2008. Pg.3.)  Hülsse draws parallels between securitisation and ‚problemisation‛ which he 
describes as an analysis of ‚discourse‛ of money laundering as compared to an analysis of its 
‚institutional frame‛ and security outcomes. Hülsse. R.,Creating Demand for Global Governance: The 
Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers  
April, 2007.Pg.168. 
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governance regimes,144 and ‚to relieve competitive pressures from specialised and 
offshore financial centres‛ 145, The ‘moral panic’ of money laundering has 
similarly been argued to  been employed to ‚advance enforcement powers, redraw 
the depositors relations with his… bank and embed international 
interdependence in(to) criminal law enforcement 146‚ It is perhaps for such reasons 
that money laundering has been associated with terrorist financing and steps have 
been taken against hawala/hundi and other aspects of informal economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 Arnone.M.  &  Padoan.P.C.,  Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary 
assessment. Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:361–386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.362. 
Also Williams.D., Op.Cit,Pg.2. 
 
145  Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005. Pg.2. 
146 Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.  2000. 
Pg.169. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
The Anti-Money Framework:  Structures and Regimes. 
 
Cooperation between national judicial authorities on the basis of treaty has 
been previously been posited, as the basis to collect evidence abroad 147.  This 
model has been superseded by ‘new modes’ of international cross-border 
evidence gathering, and enforcement 148 founded in unilaterality, both in terms of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the profusion and promulgation of international 
paradigm and standard setting.  
 
The current international anti-money laundering regime has both 
preventative and repressive aspects 149. The ex-ante preventative model exists 
under municipal and international law, which relates to processes such as 
reporting, customer due-diligence and preventative interaction with the financial 
institutions and economic actors, which may potentially facilitate money 
laundering activities.  The ex-post repressive model under the criminal law is 
retributive and involves investigation, prosecution, conviction and confiscation of 
the laundered and launderable proceeds. Other mechanisms can have 
preventative and retributive elements, in different contexts, such as international 
sanctions.  
                                                 
147 Such as Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, 
No. 4, December 2008 and Berman,P.S., `The Globalization of Jurisdiction'. 151. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Rev. 311. 2002. 
 
148 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
149 Alldridge.P., Op. Cit. Pg.442,   Stessens.G., Op. Cit.Pg.109, and Arnone.M.  &  Padoan.P.C.,  Anti-
money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment. Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:361–
386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.361. 
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Commentators 150 indicate that models of regulation within the 
international anti-money laundering framework are ‘uploaded’ by influential 
parties including the G7 and the US to a global level and diffused horizontally 
through regional and central bodies such as the IMF, the EC and the FATF.  The 
‘downloading’ actors are mostly developing countries, OFCs, newer members to 
the EC and other treaty based organisations 151.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005, following Lutz.S., ‘Convergence within National Diversity: The Regulatory State in Finance’ in 
Journal of Public Policy, 24/2, 169- 197.2004.  
 
151 Tsingou.E., Op.Cit.Pgs.7-9.  
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Figure 2: Levels of Regulation 
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3.1: The Global Framework. 
 
The FATF was established in 1989 by the leaders of the 152 states and under 
the auspices of the OECD 153  with a current mandate to extend through to the end 
of 2012154.  Its formation was amidst a general sense of a global governance deficit 
155 and perceived threats to global financial stability from money laundering. The 
FATF is the foremost, 156 most successful 157 and only international body, which 
solely deals with money laundering and more recently terrorist financing 158.  It 
currently has 36 member states 159  and seeks to cooperate in international anti-
                                                 
152 The meeting of the finance ministers from a group of seven industrialized nations. It was formed in 
1976, when Canada joined the Group of Six: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
 
153 The FATF claims to be fully independent of the OECD, although is highly representative of the 
such countries.  The FATF previously was an exclusive club of which membership was limited to only 
OCED members until the late 90s. (Hülsse. R.,Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a 
Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers  April, 2007. 
Pg.170.) Exceptions to OECD membership are the ex-soviet eastern European countries which the 
FATF describes as present(ing) an increasingly attractive target for money launderers as they 
liberalise their economic and financial systems. See Table 1 below.  
154 Damais.A., The Financial Action Task Force. Paris. 2007. Pg.72. In Muller.W.H.. Kälin.C.H.  & 
Goldsmith.J.G., Anti-money laundering: international law and practice. John Wiley and Sons, 2007. 
 
155 ‚The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the diffusion of democracy, 
globalization of markets, and the development of internet and information & communication 
technology made possible an incredible flow of information, goods, and money. This resulted in 
increased difficulties for the authorities, equipped only with nation-wide only preventive and 
repressive powers, to limit the growth of illegal financial activities internationally.‛ Arnone.M.  &  
Padoan.P.C.,  Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment. Eur J Law 
Econ (2008) 26:361–386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.362. 
 
156  Para. 5 of Directive.2005/60/EC 
157 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.73. 
158  Ibid. Pg.67.  
159 FATF member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, 
Hong Kong, China, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of the Netherlands: Netherlands, 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba., Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of 
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money laundering efforts. It operates by issuing regularly updated 
recommendations, which are targeted at its members as well as other countries, 
with a view to lead states to implement necessary legal and regulatory measures to 
prevent use of their financial systems for criminal or terrorist purposes. Its 
mandate is purely policy based and it seeks to generate the necessary political will 
to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms to combat money 
laundering. 
The FATF has also assisted in the creation of regional affiliated bodies 
known as FATF Style Regional Bodies 160 to which regional oversight is delegated 
and which assist in regional FATF compliance reviews. The FATF currently has 
Forty Recommendations on money laundering creating a framework for detecting 
and preventing money laundering, which are intended for universal global 
application across the World. These recommendations include repressive 
elements such as the criminalisation of money laundering, 161  the seizure of illicit 
funds and proceeds 162 and dissuasive criminal or civil sanctions 163  as well as 
preventative elements such as limiting the negative effects of bank secrecy and 
confidentiality 164,   customer identification and record-keeping rules 165  and the 
adoption of increased diligence by financial institutions 166 Following the terrorist 
                                                                                                                                                        
Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
 
160 There are currently eight such FSRBS which are the Asia/Pacific Group on combating money 
laundering (APG),Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism of the Council of 
Europe (MONEYVAL),Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), Intergovernmental 
Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) , and the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).  
 
161  FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 1.   
162 Ibid. Recommendation 3. 
163 Ibid. Recommendation 17. 
164 FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 4.   
165 Ibid. Recommendations 5 to 11. 
166 Ibid. Recommendations 5 to 6 & 8 to 11. 
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attacks in 2001, the FATF issued a further nine recommendations focusing on the 
combating of terrorist financing 167.  
The recommendations are not legally binding, however are effective as 
non-compliance can potentially result in what effectively constitute international 
sanctions168. These ‘countermeasures’ can include restrictions by FATF members 
(and via FSRBs) on financial institutions operating in jurisdictions the FATF’s 
deems ‘Non Cooperative Countries and Territories’ (NCCTs) (popularly known as 
the Blacklist) 169 or restrictions by member states on other members, that 
insufficiently apply the FATF recommendations 170  As of the  13th of October 2006, 
however all NCCTs have officially been delisted 171 . Under normal circumstances 
the FATF relies on peer pressure and a ‘name and shame’ policy to convince 
countries to comply  and maintains the ultimate resort  of suspension from the 
FATF for non-compliance 172. Blacklisting has the effect of creating a disincentive 
for potential investors to patronise the blacklisted jurisdiction, in effect creating 
an indirect sanctioning mechanism173. Countries, thus voluntarily commit to the 
implementation of the recommendations, with about 130 jurisdictions 
                                                 
167 FATF-GAFI: 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF). 2004. 
 
168 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.68 and Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on 
Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). Pg.200. 
 
169  Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism.Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.iii 11. 
 
170 FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 21. 
171 FATF-GAFI: High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. 2010. 
172 Schott. P.A, Op.Cit. Pg. iii 9.  
173 Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. ‚Paolo Baffi‛ 
Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009. Pg.2.  
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representing over 90 percent of global economic output having made some 
political commitment to implementation174.  
 
The OECD in parallel to the FATF blacklist, maintains a ‘grey-list’ of 
countries, which are non-compliant with OECD tax cooperation rules, and 
through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Proposes (inter-alia) seeks to provide guidance on the adoption of norms or 
administrative practices in response tax or economic issues. The OCED promotes 
transparency and information exchange, between jurisdictions so as to prevent tax 
evaders from relying on regulatory laxity to hide their assets, and to prevent 
jurisdictions from adopting measures which encourage low taxation, harmful tax 
competition,  bank secrecy and financial and corporate opaqueness  It operates 
with a view to level the playing field for competing jurisdictions and corporations 
by setting guidelines for dealing with tax havens and harmful or preferential tax 
regimes 175.  Countermeasures in response to non-compliance with OECD tax 
cooperation rules, in parallel to FATF, relies on the threat of sanctions (supported 
by the G-20) 176 although the OCED has generally been reluctant to employ such 
measures177 . Countermeasures on a national level are more widely and 
successfully employed 178.   
                                                 
174 Shehu,A.Y., International initiatives against corruption and money laundering: an overview. Journal of 
Financial Crime 2005, Vol. 12, Iss. 3, p.221-245.2005. Pg.231-232.  
 
175  Ibid. 
176 From OECD., Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Proposes. 
177 Sharman.J.C., Havens in a storm: The struggle for global tax regulation, Cornell University Press 
117.2006. Pgs.54-56.  
 
 
178 Tax deferral by placing income in OFC corporations can be regulated by employing Controlled 
Foreign Corporation Rules on a national level, although distinguishing between acceptable and 
harmful deferral. (Mccann,H., Offshore Finance, Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pgs. 112-14.) The 
practice of ‘transfer pricing’ (i.e. the non-arm’s length sale of goods/services between international 
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The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is also essentially a G7 body 
with links to the OECD, operates so as to bring all OFCs in line with international 
standards of regulation, supervision, disclosure, diligence and information-
sharing.  The rationale to this agenda is that OFCs attract large volumes of 
financial activity and do not meet international reporting standards and thus pose 
a risk to overall financial stability 179 .  
 
The Wolfsberg Group of Banks is a private sector initiative consisting of 
large global banks 180  It seeks to institute international standardised preventative 
policies for financial services and products, know your customer requirements as 
well as anti-money laundering and terrorist finance. It came about in 2000,  in 
response to a perceived need for greater harmonisation 181 The Wolfsberg Group 
operates sets of principles related to anti-money laundering in private banking, 
inter-bank relationships and client quality whilst endorsing the FATF 
recommendations on money laundering and terrorist finance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
divisions or subsidiaries of a parent company, to the end of either achieving a tax arbitrage or 
engineering the product price to limit taxation.) (Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global 
Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pgs.47-53.) has been addressed widely by local measures. Other 
measures can include thin capitalisation rules and limits to tax deductibility of certain kinds of 
coupon/interest payments.   
179 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Pg.17. Information also available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
 
180 Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Société Générale and UBS.   
 
181 Pieth.M & and Aiolfi.G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The Wolfsberg Process". Wolfsberg Group 
of Banks. 2005. 
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The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 182 is an informal 
association of FIUs,  representing 108 jurisdictions by 2010 and an observer 
member of the FATF 183 . The Egmont Group is led by the US Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Unit (FinCEN United States), and seeks to support its member 
governments in addressing financial crimes, including money laundering 184. 
Agencies of various governments, (subsequently FIUs) tailored to combat 
financial crime came together in 1995, to create the  Egmont Group and was 
followed by its acceptance of financial bodies from many other jurisdictions. This 
may in some cases have been prompted by Recommendation 26 of the FATF 
promoting the creation of national FIUs so as to report suspicious transactions and 
information related to terrorism or money laundering 185. For the purposes of 
money laundering, the Egmont Group provides support for national money 
laundering initiatives in dealing with international crimes 186. Each FIU operates 
through interaction with domestic financial institutions, as well as local judicial 
and law enforcement authorities, whilst being able to rapidly communicate and 
exchange information with external FIUs to deal with international aspects of 
financial crime 187 .   This is facilitated by the Egmont International Secure Web 
                                                 
182 A FIU defined by the Egmont Group  is a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as 
permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of 
financial information: (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism, 
or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering and 
terrorism financing. From http://www.egmontgroup.org/ This definition is entirely consistent with 
the requirements of the  Forty Recommendations.  Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: 
World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.VE-32. 
 
183 All observer members of the FATF are required to endorse FATF standards. From FATF-GAFI: 
Policy on Observer Members. 2008. 
184 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43. 
 
185 FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010.  
186 Schott. P.A, Op.Cit. Pg.IR-30. 
187 From Egmont Group., Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group. 2004.   
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System, which is used to communicate trends, analytical tools and financial 
intelligence between FIUs internationally 188 .  
 
The International Monetary Fund is an intergovernmental organization of 
187 countries, which primarily oversees macroeconomic stability and growth as 
well as offering leveraged loans to developing countries.  The IMF and the World 
Bank (the second Bretton Woods organisation) both have parallel and identical 
goals for the purposes of anti-money laundering189 . Both bodies are able to 
influence the way a country deals with the proceeds of crime or other illicit 
monies; the IMF through monitoring and the World Bank through conditions 
attached to development and other loans190. For such reasons the IMF is quite 
important in the diffusion and homogenisation of anti-money laundering laws, as 
after the FATF it is the only global organisation that can take ex-post enforcement 
action. The IMF defers to the FATF, in as much as endorsing the Forty 
Recommendations as the key set of standards in the global anti-money laundering 
regime 191. The World Bank is an observer member of the FATF 192. The IMF has 
also established a  Multi-Donor Trust Fund to which its members have pledged 
over US$30 million for the purposes of developing global anti-money laundering 
infrastructure 193. In addition the IMF provides technical support and inspects 
                                                 
188 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43. 
189 Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism.Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.X-1. 
 
190
 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003.  Pg.104. 
 
191 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit.  Pg.46. 
192 FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010. 
193 International Monetary Fund Factsheet: The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism. April 5, 2010. 
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anti-money laundering targets into its macroeconomic surveillance and global 
operations 194.  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a global 
anti-money laundering programme, which covers terrorist finance and the 
proceeds of crime. It creation came about in 1997 by mandate given to UNODC 
through the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988,  followed by the extension of its ambit,  to all 
serious crimes in 1998 195 . The UNODC has observer status with the FATF 196. The 
United Nations as a whole, subscribes to the Forty Recommendations 197 and on an 
operational level seeks to aid Member States implement measures against money-
laundering and terror finance as well as in detecting, seizing and confiscating 
criminal proceeds 198.   
Other global bodies, which mainly diffuse and contribute to the ex-ante 
preventative anti-money laundering model, within the framework of the Forty 
Recommendations, as well as against harmful tax competition, include the Basel 
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
amongst others.  
 
                                                 
194 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.47. 
195 From UNODC., UNODC on money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. 
196 FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010. 
197 Resolution 1617 (2005) of the UN Security Council: ‘’ Strongly urges all Member States to 
implement the comprehensive ,international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task 
Force’s(FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing;’’    Resolution 60/288 of the UN General Assembly (20 Sept 
2006): Annexed Plan of Action: ’To encourage States to implement the comprehensive international 
standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force, recognizing that States 
may require assistance in implementing them;’’ 
    
198 From UNODC., UNODC on money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. 
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3.2: The Regional Framework. 
 
Aside from the FRSBs discussed above, the most important regional actor 
in the International money laundering framework is the European Union. The 
European Union operates a single common market and the institutions’ directives; 
the principal legal basis to the Union’s money laundering regime are binding, in 
as much as the result to be archived but with discretion upon the members states’ 
as to the means of implantation 199.   Money laundering is seen as an impediment 
to economic integration and a significant threat to the integrity of the common 
market 200. The first money laundering directive (91/308/EEC) was based on the 
Forty Recommendations. This was followed by then Directive 2001/97/EC which 
extended  the definition of predicate offences to those beyond drugs trafficking 
and both directives were consolidated into Directive 2005/60/EC 201.    This ‘third’ 
directive implements the revised FATF Recommendations and also those related 
to terrorist finance,202  and has the main purpose of aligning the anti-money 
laundering systems of the European member states with the FATF 203. Article.21 
requires the establishment of FIUs by the member states, in parallel to both the 
FATF and Egmont Group’s requirements and definitions 204. Article 1(3) of 
2005/60/EC 205 creates the possibility of the European institutions exerting an 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether the activity was criminal in the 
                                                 
199 Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
200 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Pg.25 
201 Directive 2005/60/EC European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing 
202 From Euractiv Network., Money Laundering.  27 May 2005.  
203 Katz.E., Implementation of the Third Money Laundering Directive – an overview. Pg.207.  
204  See Footnote. 185.  
205 Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the 
property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of another Member State or in that of a 
third country. OJ 25. 11. 205. L309/15. 
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country where it occurred 206. The directive implements a ‘parent’ form of 
extraterritoriality, where European undertakings must subject their subsidiaries 
in third countries to the customer due diligence and disclosure requirements 207.  
Although there seems to be a drive towards harmonisation across the 
European Union, there are tensions as to the implementation of the third money 
laundering directive between member states 208 . The UK, France, and Germany, 
which are G7 members are strongly in favour of harmonised implementation. EU 
jurisdictions, which have an established offshore status such as Luxembourg and 
the British Crown Dependencies, as well as non-EC European States Lichtenstein 
and Switzerland etc.  are subject to the territorial and extraterritorial scope of 
2005/60/EC mainly through pressure from other members.  
The European Commission is a member of the FATF and establishes by 
declaration, that the FATF is its reference for money laundering prevention 209.  
The Commission is instrumental in implementing FATF countermeasures against 
NCCT’s trading with EU members 210.  The EU Financial Intelligence Units’ 
platform operates under the Commission, which is an organization of the member 
states FIUs and gathers financial intelligence from the Member States. 
Europol and Eurojust (the European law enforcement and judicial 
cooperation agencies) have observer status of the FATF 211.  The European Central 
                                                 
206 Zerk.J.A., ‚Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six 
regulatory areas.‛ Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010. Pg.116. 
 
207 Article.31  of Directive. 2005/60/EC 
208 Demonstrable from the aftermath of the Clearstream Affair Discussed in Robert.D & Backes.E., 
Revelation$. LesArênes, 2001.   
 
209 European Commission., Financial Crime. 2010. 
210 Turco.M., Written Question E-3497/01  to the Commission. EU cooperation with countries which do not 
cooperate with the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, established within the OECD). 
Official Journal 277 E , 14/11/2002 P. 0006 – 0008. 2002. 
211 FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010. 
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Bank, which also has observer status, endorses the FATF’s Forty 
Recommendations and convergence of anti-money laundering regulation across 
the member states 212.   
Relocation to avoid taxation has also been a concern in the European Union, 
as has the trend of ‘Belgian dentists’ 213 relying on European OFCs such as 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Switzerland to avoid home taxes 214.    To such 
ends, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) under the Council of 
the European Union created a non-legally binding Code of Conduct for business 
taxation 215, which prevents the creation of new harmful tax measures,  by  member 
states  (including the UK Crown Dependencies) as well as homogenisation, is as 
much as differences of the policies of member states, with the Code of Conduct 216.   
Other measures include the automatic sharing of information by member 
states regarding beneficial recipients of interest income within the EU, under the 
Tax Savings Directive, 217 preventing citizens within the single market from 
failing to disclose returns on their savings in their home country. Currently 
structural allowances have been made for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg in 
the form of an incrementally increasing withholding tax 218.  
                                                 
212 OJ C 40, 17.2.2005 Para.5. 
 
213 Generic term for the European retail buyer of eurobonds, representing high-income professionals 
keen to minimise tax and maximise yields. From Carew.E., The Language of Money. Allen & Unwin 
Academic. 1996.    
 
214 Sharman.J.C.,  Havens in a storm: The struggle for global tax regulation, Cornell University Press 
117.2006. Pgs.28-29. 
215 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting 98/C2/01. 
216 Ibid. 
217 (Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 
218 Paying agents will automatically deduct tax from interest income earned and pass it to their local 
tax authority, indicating how much of the total amount relates to customers in each Member State. 
The local tax authority will then keep 25% of the total amount collected and remit 75% to the various 
tax authorities within the Member States. The receiving country gets a bulk payment preserving 
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In April 2009 the Commission adopted anon-binding Communication 
identifying good governance in the tax matters for member states (including 
transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition) which follows the 
principles and conclusions of the G20 and OECD concerning uncooperative tax 
jurisdictions 219.  
The Council of Europe, although not an institution of the European Union 
is a political intergovernmental organisation of 47 members states. The Council 
has had an anti-money laundering initiative since 1977, which in 2002 was 
developed into the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) 220 . 
MONEYVAL  operates as the regional FSRB for the Council of Europe member 
countries, which are not members of the FATF, although  MONEYVAL itself is an 
associate member of the FATF, subsequent to its observer status until 2006 221. The 
members of MONEYVAL include most non-OECD European countries 222 and 
MONEYVAL also cooperates with the Bretton Woods organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
anonymity. The rate of withholding tax will be 15% from July 2005, 20% from 1st July 2008, and 
possibly 35% from July 2011. Para.1 (Council Directive 2003/48/EC, ) 
219 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the  Economic 
and Social Committee., Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters. Brussels, 28.4.2009 COM(2009) 201 
final. 2009. 
 
220 From Council Of Europe., MONEYVAL in brief. What are MONEYVAL's objectives? 
221 Ibid. 
222 Council Of Europe., Country Profiles. 2010.  
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3.3 The National Framework. 
 
 
National enforcement is usually within the jurisdiction of national judicial 
and law enforcement authorities.  For the purposes of the FATF, states are 
required to create FIUs 223 to provide a mechanism for suspicious transactional 
reporting by financial institutions etc. and international information sharing, 224 
which interact with local authorities in order to act against money laundering and 
terror finance. The role and functions of FIUs, however are left to the Egmont 
Group of which, FIUs (via their countries’) should seek to become members of 
upon formation 225, Although FIUs are basically required to receive, analyse and 
disseminate financial intelligence 226, they can vary hugely in terms of both 
structure and effectiveness depending on the jurisdiction in question 227.  
On a national level, the main actor and initiator of global anti-money 
laundering and more recently anti-terrorist financing projects is the US. The 
motivations for such initiatives perhaps come from the fact that the US is 
estimated to account for more than half of all money laundered globally 228, of 
which, according to the US Treasury 99.9% is laundered successfully 229.   
                                                 
223 See Footnote. 185. 
224 FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendations. 26 and 31.  
225 Ibid. Recommendations. 26. Interpretive Notes.  
226 Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.VE.32. 
227 Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism. The Stationery Office, 2009.  Pgs.55-59.  
 
228 Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005. Pg.7, citing an FBI Report of 2001. Also in Petras. J., US Bank Money Laundering-Enormous By Any 
Measure. 9-1-2. New York. Binghamton University Aug.2010.     
229   Ibid. 
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The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970; an early initiative requires threshold based 
record keeping by financial institutions, securities brokers and dealers etc. of their 
customer transactions and accounts, so as to create an audit trail, whilst precluding 
the necessity for the cooperation of other jurisdictions 230. This reporting regime 
was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, setting the 
threshold at transactions in excess of $10,000 231. In addition the US emphasised 
the scope of its money laundering regime, taking extraterritorial jurisdiction in a 
number of cases on the basis that the interests of the US in enforcing the Court’s of 
their courts outweighed the interests of bank secrecy in other jurisdictions 
232
. The 1984 
Act after further amendments was followed by the Money Laundering Control Act 
of 1986, which criminalised money laundering and the knowing assistance by 
third parties to acts of money laundering, 233 in effect laying down the template for 
the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. 
Upon impetus from the events of 9/11, the US Patriot Act 234 was enacted in 
2001 to consolidate existing and proposed anti-money laundering regulation and 
introduced the idea that money and security transfer systems should not be 
utilized by anonymous persons or persons hostile to the United States 235. The 2001 
Act is implemented by a variety of organisations including  FinCEN,  the FBI and 
the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) prohibiting front/shell banks from 
                                                 
230 Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.97.  
231  Ibid. 
232 Such as in United States vs. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 823, 824, (11th Cir. 1984). 
233  From Gurule.J., The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: creating a new federal offense or merely 
affording federal prosecutors an alternative means of punishing specified unlawful activity? American 
Criminal Law Review, Vol. 32, 1995. 
 
234 An act to ‚Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 
2001,‛ 
235   
Muller.W.H.. Kälin.C.H.  & Goldsmith.J.G., Anti-money laundering: international law and practice. John 
Wiley and Sons, 2007. Pg.111.  
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maintaining US accounts 236 and also creating further diligence and reporting 
requirements for ‘high risk jurisdictions’ 237 as designated by the FATF 238. The 
Patriot Act, extending the scope of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 
creates formalised extraterritorial powers for US authorities allowing the 239 of 
records, data and other information held by foreign banks, and the right to seize 
the funds of foreign banks held in US inter-bank accounts 240.  
 
The global anti-money laundering regime is progressively converging and  
homogenising, primarily as almost all global initiatives rely on the FATF as the 
principal standard-setting organisation. The FSRB structures derivative of the 
FATF, are for the purposes of policy, essentially offshoots of the greater body. All 
other international initiatives, including the Bretton Woods organisations and the 
UN as well the Egmont Group fully endorse the 40 Recommendations. This 
position is also true on the regional and national level, with all new-comers to the 
anti-money laundering regime, necessarily enacting multilateral or domestic 
initiatives in conformity to the FATF.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
236  s.313. 
237  s.312. 
238 Zerk.J.A., ‚Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six 
regulatory areas.‛ Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010.Pg.128. 
 
239  Roughly similar to a claim form in the UK. An order directed at persons/corporations requiring an 
appearance in court to testify/produce documents. The Patriot Act etc. allows foreign corporations to 
constitute persons for such purposes. 
240  Zerk.J.A., Op.Cit. Pg.127.  
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Chapter 4: 
The Anti-Money Framework: Globalisation, Homogenisation and Legitimacy. 
 
Money laundering ‚reflects and energises‛ globalisation more than any 
other crime 241. The FATF maintain that the globalisation of anti-money 
laundering regulation is founded in a response to the increasingly International 
nature of criminal activities, including bribing foreign officials, drug trafficking, 
corruption and terrorism 242. Such internationalisation of criminal activities has 
occurred in parallel with the globalisation of the World economy 243. On this basis 
the FATF seeks to extend the scope of a normative illegality to money laundering 
globally. The European Union takes a similar position, such as in Recital. 35 of the 
preamble to Directive 2005/60/EC, whereby money laundering and terrorist 
financing are international problems and the effort to combat them should be 
global.  The liberalisation of financial markets, exchange controls, internet based 
commerce and instantaneous payment systems have markedly increased the 
volume and flow of international transactions, 244 which in turn provide ample 
and flexible opportunities to disguise illicit funds 245,  as well as detract from any 
adequate identification of the locus delicti of international offences. 
Methods to avoid detection of money laundering such as money transfer 
between jurisdictions through the use of electronic money and wire transfers or 
                                                 
241 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008. Pg.438. 
 
242 FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010. 
243  Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.90. 
244 Hinterseer.K.,  Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context. The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.24. Also Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: 
Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: 
Hart Publishing. 2003.  Pg.92.  
245  Stessens.G., Op.Cit. Pg.92.  
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informal methods such as hundi/hawala 246 as well as reliance on corporate 
anonymity, attorney-client privilege and banking confidentiality, competitive 
pressures and regulatory arbitrage 247 opportunities in other jurisdictions all 
aggravate and indeed highlight the global nature of money laundering. The 
progressive internationalisation of the global economy 248 necessitates the 
regulation of that, which can only be regulated by international cooperation and 
to such ends the FATF maintains that global coverage, implementation of the set 
principles of the FATF and global compliance are critical to the fight against 
money laundering249. The effect of these efforts of the FATF is a generally 
homogenised strategy against money laundering and terrorist financing in its 
largely OECD member states 250 and beyond. 
This is particular as the FATF is the principal diffusing body of anti-money 
laundering law 251. The Forty Recommendations are endorsed and implemented 
by the various regional FSRBs and implementing states, in what seems like a 
primarily vertical relationship, through funding and guidance provided centrally 
by the FATF 252. There is very little (if not any) consideration of local political and 
economic issues with virtually no input from the affected parties’ and 
stakeholders. The nature of the implementation of the FATF recommendations 
                                                 
246 FATF-GAFI: Report on New Payment Methods. 2006. 
247 Regulatory arbitrage is where a regulated institution takes advantage of the difference between its 
real (or economic) risk and the regulatory position.  
248 FATF-GAFI: Revised Mandate. 2008 to 2012. 
 
249 FATF-GAFI:  Towards Global Coverage and Compliance. Speech by FATF President Paul Vlaanderen 
to the 8th Ad Hoc GIABA Ministerial Committee Meeting Praia, Cape Verde, 5 May 2010. 
250 Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption 
of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.376. 
 
251 Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005. Pgs.7-9.  
 
252  Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D.,Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering Regulation. 
DOI: 10.1177/1350508407080311. Organization 2007; 14; 625. Sage Publications. 2007.Pg.636. 
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remains ‘a one size fits all’ model and the ambit of the FATF is maintained as an 
exclusive organisation.  
 
The FATF claim that money laundering occurs across the World, wherever 
‘money generating crime’ can occur 253. Alternatively other sources such as the US 
Department of State 254 and commentators 255  show most developing nations are 
generally (with some exceptions) at lower levels of risk in terms of potential 
money laundering. FATF non-compliers and non co-operative jurisdictions, do 
not necessarily constitute countries posing significant money laundering risks, 
but are rather simply countries which do not implement FATF’s guidance and 
recommendations to adequate levels. A country, for instance, cannot argue that its 
exposure to money laundering is so low that it need not adopt the FATF’s 
criminalisation of money laundering or establish a financial intelligence unit 256.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
253 FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010, 
254  US Department of State., International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering 
Countries. 2007. See Table.1. 
 
255  From Lilliey, P. Dirty Dealing. 3rd edition, Kogan Page. 2006. 
256 De Koker.L., Identifying and managing low money laundering risk: perspectives on FATF's risk-based 
guidance. Journal of Financial Crime.2009. 
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FATF MEMBER 
STATES 
OECD 
MEMBER 
STATES 
Above 
World 
GDP(PPP) 
$10,500. 
(WB 2009). 
EXCHANGE 
MARKETCAP 
$100bn+ 
(WFE/Wikinvest 
2009).* 
MONEY 
LAUNDERING 
RISK INDEX 
RATING † 
OECD GDP 
$m 2009. 
(World 
Bank 
2009).\\ 
  
        
Argentina  Y Y C    
Australia Y Y Y PC 924843   
Austria Y Y Y PC 384908   
Belgium  Y Y Y‡ C 497586   
Brazil  Y Y PC    
Canada Y Y Y PC 1336067   
China   Y PC    
Denmark Y Y Y LR 309596   
EC Commission Y n/a. n/a. n/a. n/a.   
Finland Y Y Y M 237512   
France Y Y Y‡ PC 2649390   
Germany Y Y Y PC 3346702   
Greece Y Y  PC 329924   
Hong Kong  Y Y PC    
Iceland Y Y  M 12133   
India   Y PC    
Ireland Y Y Y C 227193   
Italy Y Y Y PC 2112780   
Japan Y Y Y PC 5067526   
Luxembourg Y Y Y PC 52449   
Mexico Y Y  PC 874902   
Netherlands Y Y Y‡ PC 792128   
New Zealand Y Y Y M 125160   
Norway Y Y Y M 381766   
Portugal Y Y Y C 227676   
Rep.of Korea Y Y Y C 832512   
Russian Fed.  Y Not Available.  PC    
Singapore  Y Y PC    
South Africa  Y Y C    
Spain Y Y Y PC 1460250   
Sweden Y Y Y M 406072   
Switzerland Y Y Y PC 500260   
Turkey Y Y Not Available.  PC 617099   
United Kingdom Y Y Y PC 2174530   
United States Y Y Y PC 14256300   
Gulf Co-op. Council  Y§ n/a. C¶    
        
 Chile Y Y C    
 Czech Rep. Y  C    
 Hungary Y  C    
 Poland Y Y C    
 Slovak Rep. Y  C    
 Slovenia Y  M    
Total: \\     40137264   
        
        
 LEGEND CODES:  PC= Primary Concern. C=Concern.  M=Monitored Only. LR= Low to No Risk.  Y= Yes.    
* Collectively accounting for 75 % (approx.) of total global market capitalisation. The World Federation    
    of Exchanges. Statistics. WFE.2009.      
† US State Dept. Data: Major Money Laundering Countries. 2007.      
‡ Including Euronext.       
§ Member States.        
¶ The UAE is of Primary Concern and only Oman is Monitored.     
\\ Accounting for 70% of World GDP. (World Total $58,133,309m)       
    From: The World Bank., World Development Indicators database. Gross domestic product. World Bank. 2009.   
 
 
Table 1: Analysis of FATF member states. 
 
56 
 
  
R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. 
 
  
Other evidence suggests that although many mechanisms, which promote 
financial globalisation are in place, the global financial market is in fact far from 
globalised. The US alone for instance imports about 72% of all global capital 
exported with a majority originating in Japan 257. Similarly there is a 70% ‘home 
bias’ in terms of portfolio diversification for the US and 63% for a sample of 
developed countries 258.  Other indicators include the lack of correlation between 
savings and investment levels within countries, which should conform globally as 
investors diversify their portfolios across different markets. It seems that such 
capital flows are mostly concentrated in the OECD  259 and it is therefore more 
accurate to say that the global financial system is polarised towards wealthier 
nations, which suggests that contrary to the FATF’s claims, money laundering is 
more likely to occur in wealthier nations. This is particular if deeper financial 
integration does indeed motivate deeper financial criminality. 260 Furthermore, 
many developing nations simply do not have the financial infrastructure to 
facilitate money laundering,  
Most OECD countries and indeed FATF countries are of primary concern as 
money laundering nations 261 however action by the FATF is geared towards non-
(G7)G8 member countries although by FATF’s own standards, non-compliance is 
highly evident of its more powerful member states 262.  
The ‘new order’ of international regulation against OFCs represents a 
radical change in accepted banking principles. It exceeds anything that OECD 
                                                 
257 From Stulz.R., The Limits of Financial Globalization. Journal of Finance. 1595 LX. 2005. 
258  Ibid. 
259  Scott.H.S., International Finance: Law and Regulation. Sweet & Maxwell 2007. Pg.13. 
260 Shown empirically by Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial 
Centers. ‚Paolo Baffi‛ Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009. 
261 US Department of State., International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering 
Countries. 2007. 
262  Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.41.  
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countries have achieved amongst themselves in terms of tax cooperation and 
compliance shall directly benefit OECD countries and their tax authorities at the 
expense of OFCs and their economies 263.  
The FATF suffers from a severe ‘input legitimacy’ 264 gap. It is in essence an 
OECD body, with legitimacy inputs from the IMF and World Bank 265 and is 
mainly representative of developed economies 266 The recommendations 
themselves are focused on the US-centric criminal and regulatory enforcement 
approaches to combating money laundering and disrupting criminal finance,267 
and the FATF has often accepted guidance and funding from the US 268.  
In spite of the extent of global commitment to the FATF (130 jurisdictions) 
only its 33 members were instrumental in framing the Forty Recommendations 
having the power of final approval with little or no input from the jurisdictions to 
be subjected to the FATF regimen269  The various regional FSRBs are required to 
endorse and implement the Forty Recommendations rather than develop any of 
                                                 
263 Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round 
Table (2001), 359 (199–212). 2001. Pg.206.  
 
264 Input legitimacy describes the understanding that rules are legitimate as rule making has followed 
some democratic procedures, through representation or inclusion of the affected stakeholders;  (those 
parties’ to whom principal entities’ ‘should’ discharge an accountability to. From Standard and Poor’s 
definition. In Bradley.N., Corporate Governance: A Risk worth Measuring. UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2003/3). 
Scharpf,F.W., Democratic Policy in Europe. European Law Journal. Volume 2, Issue 2, pgs. 136–155, July 
1996 Scharpf. F.W, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999.  
265 Drezner.D.W.,The Viscosity of Gloobal Governance: When is Forum Shopping Expensive.The Fletcher 
School. Tufts University. November 2006. Pg.17.  
266  See Table.1. 
267 Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption 
of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.375.  
 
268 From Wechsler.W.F.,  Follow the Money. From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001.  
 
269 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pgs.73-73. 
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their own, and receive extensive technical and financial assistance from the FATF 
270. On a national level compliance with the Forty Recommendations consists of 
extremely intrusive ‘micro management’, with highly detailed legislative and 
administrative directives prescribing the nature of ‘improvements’ that states 
must enact 271. The FATF has thus been described as a deliberately 
unrepresentative agency attempting to enforce its selected standards globally 272.    
Although suggestions have been made as to the possibility of FATF having 
a degree of ‘output legitimacy’ 273 i.e. where enacted policies meet the interests of 
the concerned stakeholders 274, this can only be the case if jurisdictions, which are 
non-compliant or are otherwise domestically politically or economically 
disincentivised from compliance with the FATF are excluded from the class of 
stakeholders.  
The FATF is not created out by treaty and its regimen has none of the 
legitimacy of the consent of the jurisdictions subject to the Forty 
Recommendations and countermeasures, which potentially may violate 
international law 275. Such lack of legitimacy (amidst complaints from the IMF and 
                                                 
270 Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D.,Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering Regulation. 
DOI: 10.1177/1350508407080311. Organization 2007; 14; 625. Sage Publications. 2007. Pg.636.  
271 Such as the case of the Bahamas as cited by Doyle.T., Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: 
current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002.   
272 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008.  Pg.443.  
 
273 Such as that the FATF seeks to balance between input and output legitimacy, and thus between 
legitimacy and effectiveness, whereby output legitimacy increases as parties’ subject to the FATF’s 
regime increasingly participate and contribute.   Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D., Loc.Cit.         
274 Scharpf. F.W, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Pg.99.  
 
275 Such as Art.2 of the UN Charter setting out sovereign equality and non intervention. The General 
Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) of December 1960 on Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of States holds:   
i) No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal 
affairs or external affairs of another state. The armed intervention and all other forms of interference 
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World Bank 276 is thought to be why the FATF (temporarily) ceased its practice of 
blacklisting as subject jurisdictions could argue that FATF being an ‘exclusive 
club’ cannot interfere in national internal affairs and competences directly 277. In 
its pursuit of legitimacy, the FATF wound down its NCCT list, seemingly in 
exchange for endorsement of the Forty Recommendations by the IMF 278. The 
FATF, nevertheless recently issued a ‘statement’ (short of unreserved blacklisting) 
which listed Iran, Pakistan. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and São Tomé and 
Príncipe as threats to the International financial system 279.  Currently the FATF 
suggests that ‚as of 13 October 2006, there are no Non-Cooperative Countries and 
Territories‛280, although other sources 281 suggest that a form of default blacklisting 
with the threat of sanctions, is a continuing FATF strategy, with a movement away 
from explicit labelling of jurisdictions as NCCTs.  
                                                                                                                                                        
or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
element, are condemned.  
ii) No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to 
coerce another State in order to get him to make the exercise of its sovereign rights to away from it 
advantages of any kind. In addition, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate 
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrown the regime of 
another State, or interfere in civil unrest in another State.  
Art.41 of the UN Charter similarly requires the Security Council to legitimise sanctions. 
The FATF may also violate International Trade law possibly under GATT. Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. 
& Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford 
University Press. 2006. Pg.74.  
276 Hülsse. R.,Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. 
Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers  April, 2007. Pg.167.  
277 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, 
December 2008.  Pg.444 
 
278 Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005. Pg.11.  
279 FATF-GAFI: FATF Statement. February 2009. 
280 FATF-GAFI: High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions . 2010. 
281 Daily Times., FATF blacklists Pakistan for terror financing, Saturday, February 20, 2010. The Anti 
Money Laundering Network and Group Companies. Sanctions: Not quite FATF NCCT. But close. 19 
February 2010. Reuters., Group to reveal laundering, terror funding blacklist 17 Feb 2010.  
 
60 
 
  
R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. 
 
  
  The blacklisting procedures of the FATF have also been argued to be 
reserved specifically for non-G7/G8 282 countries, in spite of evidence of non-
compliance by more powerful FATF members. The United States, Canada and 
Luxembourg, although consistently shown to fail to meet the standards required 
of the Forty Recommendations have had no likelihood of ever appearing on 
NCCT list or being subject to any FATF countermeasures 283. It has also been 
suggested that blacklisting may be counterproductive by certifying and signalling 
the offshore opportunities a jurisdiction provides, to that jurisdiction’s benefit 284.  
Notably regulatory reform alone, subsequent to blacklisting does not in fact 
detract from a position of non-cooperation (the false friend effect) 285 as 
jurisdictions simply enact legislative changes etc. to be removed from the 
blacklist, with significant money laundering occurring in jurisdictions such as the 
Bahamas and the Caymans long after removal from the NCCT list 286.  This may 
simply be because the extent of pressure exerted by the FATF jurisdictions, is only 
enough to just compel compliance, and is biased towards domestic profits rather 
than the elimination of criminality 287.  
                                                 
282 Russia joined the FATF after being delisted. 
283  Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.41, Blickman.T.,  Countering Illicit and Unregulated Money 
Flows,Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation. Crime & Globalisation, Transnational 
Institute Briefing Series December 2009. Pg.19. Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational 
Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of 
Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.4.  
284 Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering and Financial Offshore Centres: A Political Economy Approach. 
Eisevier B.V. 2006. Pg.338. 
285 Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi University 
Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg337.  
286 From Murphy.R., The EU money laundering white list. Tax Research UK. June 2010, and  Pinder 
.M.N.,  Bahamas Still A Major Money Laundering Centre, Report Claims. The Bahama Journal.2005. 
 
287 Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. ‚Paolo Baffi‛ 
Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009. Pg.30 
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The implementation of the Forty Recommendations, as well as FATF and 
OECD blacklisting and threats to sanction detract from the commitments to the 
free movement of capital and goods of the OECD 288 in as much as non-OECD 
members and the EU, with regards to third states. If effect, the FATF acts as the 
protectionist arm of the OCED, with the purpose of although allowing the OECD 
to avail all the benefits of globalisation, externalising the externalities of money 
laundering and domestic tax evasion to poorer nations.  The costs of 
implementation and compliance with reporting requirements and disclosure 
standards are thought to be much higher for developing countries and may have 
the effect of actually driving liquidity from the formal market to the underground 
economy 289. The costs of compliance are disproportionately high on developing 
countries’ financial operations as compared to those in the developed world, 
which can internalise such costs owing to better national financial infrastructure, 
market depth and economies of scale 290.   Estimates given by FinCEN suggest the 
figure of $109million annually in compliance costs alone, without considering 
training, FIU/institution building and other costs 291. A second global figure, 
alleged to be from the American Bankers Association cites $10 billion in overall 
implementation costs 292.  
The FATF’s trade-off between democracy and effectiveness and the policy 
asymmetries that the Forty Recommendations entail, are a clear rejection of 
                                                 
288  OECD., Trade and the economic recovery: why open markets matter. May 2010. 
289 Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pgs.72-73.  
290 Ibid. It seems that these costs may also be too high, for developing countries, where for lack of any 
evidence of  the general effectiveness of  implementing money laundering regulations,  in pursuit of 
‚uncertain positive effects‛ doubts have been raised as to the investment of 400m SEK ($54m) in 
improving the anti-money laundering infrastructure of banks and regulators.  Magnusson.D., "The 
costs of implementing the anti-money laundering regulations in Sweden". Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, Vol. 12 Iss: 2, pp.101 – 112. 2009. 
291 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.74. 
292 Ibid. 
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economic efficiency and the possibility of regulatory competition, in terms of 
movement of capital to jurisdictions of least regulation and taxation 293.  Hülsse 
amongst other commentators suggests that the FATF has essentially ‘talked’ 
money laundering, as a global problem, requiring a global solution into existence, 
whilst employing a mixture of coercion and persuasion in order to implement 
their purpose.  In his analysis of the discourse surrounding the issue of money 
laundering, and active ‘problemisation’ 294 of money laundering by the FATF, he 
describes the worldwide nature of money laundering as suggested by the FATF 
(as opposed to an exclusively Western phenomenon) as ‘constructed’ by merits of 
the mandate given to the FATF by the World’s richest countries 295. This, along 
with FATF domination of  the institutional framework of the World’s anti-money 
laundering regime and expert knowledge and advice provided by the FATF makes 
it extremely difficult for other countries, to cast doubts as to the FATF’s views.  In 
the course of its problemisation of money laundering, the FATF rhetorically 
necessitates the phenomenon, as an objective problem through ‘raising awareness’ 
about money laundering and by merits of its domination of the institutional 
framework, does not need to justify its position 296.  The FATF has possibly owing 
to its waning legitimacy, problemised money laundering by ‘firmly linking it to 
other, arguably better established political problems, such as crime and 
                                                 
293 Doyle.T., Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate 
international law. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002.  Pg.11 
294 ‛(B)y problemisation  we mean the way in which experience comes to be organised so as to render 
something as a "problem " to be addressed and rectified: interpretive schemes for codifying 
experience, ways of evaluating it in relation to particular norms, and ways of linking it up to wider 
social and economic concerns and objectives.‛ From Miller.P. & N . Rose, "Production, Identity, and 
Democracy" Theory and Society. 24 1995 Pg. 429. In Allen.B., Corporate Theory: Jurisprudence's Heart of 
Darkness. The University of British Columbia. 1996.   
 
295 Hülsse. R.,Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. 
Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers  April, 2007. Pg.169.  
296  Ibid. Pg.170. 
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terrorism’297  and creating it as a ‘meta crime’ behind organised crime and 
terrorism298.  
The Egmont Group suffers from issues, between the different forms and 
architectures of FIUs across the World, with some being closer to law enforcement 
and thus more effective than others 299 and some FIUs being mere token 
organisations 300.   Not all FIUs are in fact capable of exchanging sensitive 
information related to policing or law enforcement, which can lead to 
misunderstandings or miscommunications and ultimately failures in taking action 
against serious financial crime 301.   
 
The US position following 9/11 has been highly aggressive and 
extraterritoriality under the Patriot Act has been seen to conflict with 
competences in other jurisdictions. This is particular as the scope of the US 
criminal jurisdiction under the 2001 Act has been extended exclusively to cover 
money laundering though foreign banks. This jurisdiction also extends to  foreign 
account holding institutions in the US for the purposes of penalties even if the 
questionable transaction, is without of the US 302. The 2006 Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) case demonstrates the potential 
for conflict originating from the Patriot Act. SWIFT a European undertaking with 
                                                 
297   Ibid. Pg.173. 
298   Ibid.  
299  Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism. The Stationery Office, 2009.  Paras. 55 to 59.  
300  Such as Saudi Arabia, which was seemingly admitted to the Group to incentivise its efforts in the 
War on Terror.  Dorsey. J.M., Saudis fail to halt terrorism funding despite minor gains. Deutsche Welle.20 
Dec 2009.  
301 Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism. Loc.Cit. Also discussed in Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in 
Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43. 
       
302 Doyle,C.,  The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch.CRS Report for Congress. April 18, 2002. Zerk.J.A.,   
‚Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six regulatory areas.‛ 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010. 
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a US presence was subpoenaed by OFAC. Amidst accusations of commercial 
espionage and of the US seeking competitive advantages, 303 compliance with the 
subpoena according to the Belgian Data Protection Authority had resulted in 
violations of Belgium’s enactment of Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection 
Directive) and possibly the right to protection of personal data under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article. 8) 304.  The European 
Parliament rejected an interim EU/US agreement data sharing agreement 
regarding SWIFT on grounds that it did not protect European civil liberties and 
fundamental rights in February 2010, although the Council did attempt to 
negotiate an agreement with the US 305.   
 
The OECD by way of its efforts to limit harmful tax practices seeks to ‘level 
the playing field’ 306 between competing actors, may be unfounded as the OCED 
alone accounts for nearly three quarters of the World’s wealth 307. The OCED has 
not included its member states with OFC/tax-haven characteristics in the thirty-
eight jurisdictions deemed co-operative by the OCED, which by default therefore 
escape OECD countermeasures and condemnation 308. Although the interests of 
onshore citizens who bear the cost of offshore activities are in no way compatible 
                                                 
303 Levi.M.,Combating the financing of terrorism: a history and assessment of the control of "threat finance". 
British Journal of Criminology. 2010. Pg.659. 
304 From Graves.R.J. & Ganguli.I., Extraterritorial Application of the USA PATRIOT Act and Related 
Regimes: Issues for European Banks Operating inthe United States. Privacy & Data Security Law 
Journal.October 2007. 
 
305 Dretzka.E., & Mildner.S-A.,Anything but SWIFT: Why Data Sharing is Still a Problem for the EU. 
American Institute for Contemprary German Studies. John Hopkins University May 2010.  Pgs.4-5. 
 
306 OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998.  
307  See Table.1.  
308  OECD., Jurisdictions Committed to Improving Transparency and Establishing Effective Exchange of 
Information in Tax Matters.2009. 
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with money laundering and terror finance, they nevertheless also bear the costs of 
legitimate capital flight from onshore jurisdictions. The OECD in a similar 
fashion to the FATF seeks to penalise OFCs/tax-havens for capital flight and 
corporate migration, which its members (possibly owing to regulatory capture  309) 
generally fail to address domestically 310.  
 
 Financial globalisation is not occurring in parallel with economic 
globalisation, with the global financial system polarised towards wealthier 
nations.  The global anti-money laundering regime is progressively homogenising 
although lacking in democratic legitimacy and effectiveness.  The OECD and the 
FATF, seem in effect to be affirming the  ‘Lucas Paradox’ 311 on the fora of anti-
money laundering and harmful tax competition, with a view to protection of 
OECD financial markets and a disregard for economic efficiency, competition and 
inputs from countries falling under the FATF/OECD regime.  
 
                                                 
309  Regulatory capture occurs when a state regulatory agency created to act in the public interest 
instead acts in favour of the commercial or special interests that dominate in the industry or sector it 
is charged with regulating. 
 
310 From Huffington.A., Offshore Corporate Tax Havens: Why Are They Still Allowed? Global Policy 
Forum. June 1 2010. 
 
311 The observation that capital is not flowing from developed countries to developing countries 
despite the fact that developing countries have lower levels of capital per worker and thus offer 
greater yields.  From Lucas.R.,  "Why doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?", American 
Economic Review 80 (2): 92–96. 1990. Also Alfaro.L. Kalemli-Ozcan.S & Volosovych.V., "Why Doesn't 
Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 11901, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 2005. 
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OECD Members 
Financial Centre 
Ranking by 
External 
Assets (June 
2008) $m * 
 Non-OECD OFC ‡ Ranking by 
External 
Assets 
 (June 2008) 
$m * 
  
       
United Kingdom†  5647300  Caymans 1828000   
United States 5309100  Singapore 484900   
France 2144900  Jersey 442860   
Germany 1986500  Hong Kong 323500   
Netherlands 1631000  Bahamas 247200   
Italy 1436400  Guernsey 184400   
Ireland 1371800  W.Indies(Avge) 128600   
Spain 1252400  Bermuda 104100   
Luxembourg 1057900  Dutch Antilles 74700   
Switzerland 868700  Panama 74600   
Belgium 757800  Bahrain 61400   
Japan 651000  Isle of Man 42500   
Australia 373300  Gibraltar 21100   
Canada 359300  Barbados 19400   
   Mauritius 17500   
   Macao 7900   
   Lebanon 6500   
   Aruba 2100   
   Samoa 1500   
   Vanuatu 120   
       
Total:  24847400   4072880   
       
  OECD's Largest Financial 
Centres Ranked by Bank's 
External Assets. 
   Non-OECD's Largest Offshore 
Financial Centres Ranked by Bank's 
External Assets. 
  
       
* Data on Financial Assets: Bank for International Settlements. 2008.   
† Excluding Crown Dependencies.     
‡ Including Crown Dependencies.      
 
Table 2: OFCs Assets 
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Chapter 5: 
 
The Effects of Regulation on Offshore Centres. 
 
 
Westphalian Sovereignty 312 holds that the government of a country is 
sovereign within its own territory and countries shall not interfere with each 
others’ affairs 313.  This position agrees with Article. 2 of the UN Charter 314. 
Commentators have suggested that for the purposes of the OFC’s and their 
regulation (multilateral or otherwise) that either OFCs cannot be abolished 
without challenging state sovereignty or alternatively that OFCs deliberately 
abuse or engineer their sovereignty in order to benefit at the expense of other 
nation states 315. OFCs, by merits of their ability to make their own laws, facilitate 
legal financial services with tax advantages and conversely the opportunity to 
channel illegal funds 316. Since onshore centres are very likely to be tax havens, 
anti-money laundering actions exerted by onshore institutions may also be 
(partially) motivated by the desire to reduce tax losses 317. It has been suggested 
that the FATF’s blacklisting procedures although prima-facie aimed at money 
                                                 
312  From the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ denoting a series of  European peace treaties signed between May 
and October 1648. 
 
313 Osiander.A., Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. International Organisation. 
55, 2, Spring 2001. Cited by Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: 
Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR 
Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005, and Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of 
Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.  
314  See Footnote. 278.  
 
315  From Tranøy.B.S.,  ‘Offshore finance and money laundering: the politics of combating parasitic state 
strategies’, Rpt no 11, The Globalisation Project, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. 2002, and 
Palan.R., ‘Tax havens and the commercialisation of state sovereignty’. International Organisation, 56/1, 151-
176. 2002. 
316 Picard.P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. ‚Paolo Baffi‛ 
Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009.Pg,4.  
317 Ibid. 
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laundering, in fact place too much attention low-tax jurisdictions 318  in parallel to 
the OCED. This may well be the case, as the FATF is more likely to implement 
countermeasures, which on a forum of anti-money laundering are far more 
effective than the OECD’s grey-listing and other harmful tax competition efforts. 
The OCED, which along with the FATF leads the campaign against tax-havens 
and OFCs accounts for more than 60% of offshore assets by way of its financial 
centres 319. The extent to which, such funds relate to illicit activity is unclear, 
however it is noteworthy that the US is estimated to account for more than half of 
all money laundered globally, 320 The limited implementation of the Forty 
Recommendations in OCED countries and the dichotomy of symbioses of OFCs, 
with the licit and illicit economies, cast doubts as to the integrity of constructions 
of money laundering as a global crime.  For such reasons, it is fair to assume the 
possibility of competition between the OCED and non-OECD OFCs as a driver to 
the homogenization of the FATF regime.  It is also clearly the case that if money is 
to be laundered at all then a ‘rational politician’ might wish to have it happen in 
his own, rather than an adjacent jurisdiction 321.  
The effects of the various anti-money laundering campaigns on OFCs is 
complex and mixed 322. Although the flow of foreign financial assets to NCCT 
jurisdictions does not seem to have greatly diminished 323 a return to traditional 
                                                 
318 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.71. 
319  See Table.2.  
320 Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 
2005. Pg.7, citing an FBI Report of 2001. Also in Petras. J., US Bank Money Laundering-Enormous By Any 
Measure. 9-1-2. New York. Binghamton University Aug.2010.     
 
321 Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.  2000. 
Pg.171. 
322  See Table.3. 
323 Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation. European Journal of Law and 
Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.388.  
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onshore banking has been observed 324 as OFCs are seen to be falling behind in 
terms of asset growth and as it is also becoming harder to hide money in OFCs 325. 
A movement away from debts to equities in pursuit of higher yields, particularly 
in Europe 326 and the US 327  as well as lower tax pressures, market depth and 
increased liquidity have been cited as contributory to the movement away from 
OFC’s, which cannot compete adequately in this area. It is possible that as the 
traditional markets of OFCs are eroded by OECD and FATF pressures, such 
centres may in fact attract more illicit funds than before.  
Blacklisting alone does not seem to have the desired effects of the FATF, 
without the possibility of countermeasures to compel compliance 328. Countries on 
the first NCCT list 329 such as the Bahamas and the Caymans 330 have had much 
wider and comprehensive compliance results as compared to later additions, 
whose cosmetic efforts are thought to be the result of ‘false friend’ 331 or ‘reluctant 
friend’ 332 approaches by such NCCTs to the FATF.  The FATF having moved away 
from open sanctions and blacklisting to a lighter-touch methodology, for its 
                                                 
324 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Citing a 2001. Report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Pg.5. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid. 
327  From Gerson Lehrman Group., Institutional Investors Shifting Toward Equity Market Neutral 
Strategies. November 25, 2009. 
328  Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation. European Journal of Law and 
Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.389. 
329 FATF-GAFI: Review to identify NCCTs: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of AML Measures. 
2000. Available at:  
 
330 As an example, in the Caymans, the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law has criminalised the 
laundering of proceeds of crime since 1996. The 2007 revision enables the restraint and freezing of the 
proceeds of crime, the disclosure of information about them and the confiscation or forfeiture of 
assets. It also establishes CAYFIN, the Caymans FIU,  disclosure to which, regarding the proceeds or 
suspected proceeds of criminal conduct, money laundering or suspected money laundering and  the 
financing of terrorism does not breach Cayman disclosure rules under  the Confidential Relationships 
(Preservation) Law (1995 Revision).   
 
331  Masciandaro. D., Op.Cit.   Pg.388.  
332Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering and Financial Offshore Centres: A Political Economy Approach. 
Eisevier B.V. 2006. Pg.309.  
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legitimacy gap, mainly seeks to homogenise anti-money laundering regulation in 
developing countries, as can be seen from recent FATF ‘statements’ 333 regarding 
jurisdictions subject to money laundering risks. Blacklisting on the other hand 
has had the effect of inciting OFCs to widen their services such as creating or 
expanding stock exchanges, as in the Channel and Cayman  Islands respectively, 
or to enter into the electronic banking and online brokerage arenas 334.  
The effects of FATF regulation have been widely different for different 
kinds of OFCs. 
  Luxembourg, an OECD and EU member, has maintained its bank secrecy 
laws, in spite of intense pressure by the OECD and the FATF and has consistently 
rejected the OECD’s regime regarding harmful tax competition 335. Directive 
2003/48/EC, shall make an automatic exchange of information mandatory by 2011, 
and an incrementally increasing withholding tax is currently in place, until this 
date. Luxembourg also collects withholding taxes on behalf of the US Internal 
Revenue Service 336. As of yet in the both the cases of the EU and US, Luxembourg 
does not disclose account holders’ identities. Luxembourg, has taken steps to 
abolish its 1929 Holding Company Laws, which exempted such companies from 
taxation by December 2010. This was in response to such laws being held to 
constitute a State Aid under Article.107 (ex-87) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union 337. In spite of such measures Luxembourg generally remains a 
successful financial centre, catering to private wealth unimpeded 338 and 
                                                 
333 FATF-GAFI: FATF Statement. February 2009. 
334 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Citing a 2001. Pg.5. 
335 Ibid. Pg.52 
336 Ibid. 
337 From Parize.H., Luxembourg in perspective. European Lawyer, Vol. 77, (48) 48.2008. 
338 Parize.H., Luxembourg in perspective. European Lawyer, Vol. 77, (48) 48.2008. 
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maintaining generally low levels of taxation, including the lowest rates of VAT in 
Europe 339.  
Jersey, another European OFC jurisdiction has seen a near doubling of its 
GDP between 2001 and 2010 and foreign bank deposits increasing from £167bn in 
2001340 to £212bn in 2008 341. Its financial sector has also grown proportionally. The 
Bailiwick maintains a low tax regime, with no capital gains or inheritance taxes, 
but currently maintains a withholding tax regime similar to Luxembourg’s and is 
phasing out income tax reliefs by 2011342.  
  
Caribbean basin based OFCs, possibly for being well within the US sphere 
of influence 343 implemented the criminalisation of money laundering, for fear of 
capital flight, very early on in the anti-money laundering campaign 344. Jamaica, 
for instance created money laundering and forfeiture legislation in the early 
nineties 345. The Cayman Islands, which was considered on the FATF’s first NCCT 
report in 2000,346 in compliance tightened it regulations, ‘much too fast in its 
desperation not to fall afoul’ of the US and OECD 347. By 2009, its legal framework 
                                                 
339 International Tax Review., World Tax 2007. Luxembourg, Country Report.2007. 
340 Levin. M., ‘The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe’, CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002.  
Citing a 2001. Pg.52. 
341 Jersey Finance., Quarterly Report. 2008-09. 
342 LOWTAX.NET., Jersey: Personal Taxation. 
 
343 The distance between two jurisdictions for the purposes of offshoring, lowers cross-holdings, 
characterised as an ‘iceberg’ cost that diminishes the value of the OFCs holdings. Shared land border, 
geographical proximity, a common language or currency raises cross-holdings, between jurisdictions. 
From Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M.,Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts? The Economic Journal, 117 
(October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007. 
 
344 Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
 
345 Forfeiture of Proceeds Act 1994. 
346 FATF-GAFI: Review to identify NCCTs: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of AML Measures. 
2000. 
347  Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.217.  
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was found to be fully comprehensive, to FATF standards 348. However, this was 
amidst a climate of declining corporate registrations and foreign investments and 
a generally stifled economy 349. The Caymans have also bi-laterally implemented 
measures equivalent to Directive 2003/48/EC (Savings Tax Directive) exchanging 
information on the interest bearing accounts of European citizens. It is thought 
such disclosure may cost the Caymans up to $50 million dollars annually from 
business lost from EU investors 350.  The Cayman economy’s growth rate has fallen 
from a consistent 4 to 5 percent through the 90s to 1.7 percent in 2005. It fell again 
to 1.1percent in 2008 then to -6percent in 2009. Growth is expected to fall further 351 
with increasing unemployment, poverty and crime352. Similar trends are 
observable in other Caribbean OFCs such as the Bahamas 353  and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, which according to some commentators is unlikely to survive as a 
financial centre, following economic crisis and the imposition of direct rule by the 
UK in 2009 354. Based on such developments, it has been suggested that only OFCs 
that are capable of ‘adapting to the new order’ are capable of surviving 355.   
                                                 
348 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force., Cayman Islands: Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes, FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. IMF 
Country Report No. 09/324. December 2009. 
 
349  Brittain-Catlin.W., Op.Cit. Pg.218.  
350 Ibid. 
351  US Department of State., International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering 
Countries. 2007. 
352  Brittain-Catlin.W., Op.Cit. Pg.223. 
353  In response to the attack by the OECD, the FATF, and the FSB (then FSF) the Bahamas enacted 
eleven new anti-money laundering statutes by the end of 2000, and was thought to be one of the most 
highly regulated, anti-money laundering jurisdictions in the World. The results were economic 
slowdown and negative competitive effects resultant from 'excessive' tax information demands by 
OECD countries. From Maynard Counsel and Attorneys., Anti Money Laundering Law and Practice in 
The Bahamas. Maynard Law Publishing. 2004. 
 
354 Hampton.M.P. & Christensen.J.,Offshore Finance Centres and Tax Havens: what next for OFCs in small 
economies?  Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.13 November 2009. 
355 From PriceWaterhouseCoopers., A Practitioner’s Guide to the FSA Regulation of Banking. London : 
City and Financial Publishing. 2002. 
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 Singapore according to the OECD is amongst the top private wealth centres 
in the World and the third leading financial centre 356 The World Bank have also 
rated Singapore the World’s easiest place to do business for both 2009 and 2010 357. 
Although it is an FATF member and endorses the Forty Recommendations, it is 
not an OECD member 358.  Taxation is generally low with no capital gains, 
dividend taxes and income taxed at 20% after US$235000. There are also very 
favourable exemptions and tax reliefs for start-up businesses 359. Singapore is 
considered a jurisdiction of primary concern by the US State Department, for the 
purposes of money laundering, 360 owing to bank secrecy, the lack of reporting 
requirements,361 limited withholding taxes, reliefs for foreign sourced income 362 as 
well as no defined tax offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other 
Serious Crimes Act 1992.   It is also a primary destination for capital flight 363 with 
high potential for a being a hub for terror finance.  
A similar case can be seen with the Russian Federation also an FATF 
member but not part of the OCED.  The Federation is also a jurisdiction of 
primary concern for money laundering and terror finance,364 and has a flat income 
tax regime at 13%. Dividend income is at 9% with exemptions and corporate tax is 
                                                 
356 From Lysaght.B., London Keeps Lead as Finance Center; Confidence Wanes. Bloomberg. March 2009. 
 
357 World Bank., Doing Business 2010 Report. World Bank 2010. 
358 See Table.1.  
359 LOWTAX.NET., Singapore Domestic Corporate Taxes. 
360 See Table.1. 
361 US Department of State., International narcotics control strategy report: Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 
2007. 
362 LOWTAX.NET., Singapore Domestic Corporate Taxes. 
363 US Department of State., International narcotics control strategy report: Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 
2007. 
364 See Table1. 
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roughly at 20% 365. In spite of it tax regime, revenue collection is sparse with 
endemic corruption 366 and the high risk of money laundering and terror finance367.  
The FATF/OECD regime may also have the effect of precluding under-
developed jurisdictions from providing offshore facilities. The offshore 
aspirations of countries like the Seychelles368 for instance were more or less 
extinguished in their inception. Other factors such as the prohibitive costs of 
reporting, diligence and establishing FIUs make it economically unviable for 
developing countries to operate offshore operations, within the ambit of FATF 
guidelines. It is also likely that jurisdictions with OFC characteristics, under FATF 
pressure, find it more viable and expedient to move towards and specialise in tax-
haven activity which as of yet has not been sanctionable by the OECD.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
365 Worldwide Tax. Russia. 
366 From Ries.N., Business, Taxes and Corruption in Russia . Colgate University.2006, and Welu.C.M. & 
Muchnik.Y.,Corruption: Russia's Economic Stumbling Block. American and European anti-corruption laws 
could help solve a longtime problem in Russia. Bloomberg. Aug.2009.  
 
367 Despite a general rating of compliance by the FATF (FATF-GAFI: "Second Mutual Evaluation Report 
on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Russian Federation," Paris, France: 
FATF, June 2008.)   the Russian Federation remains one of the World’s primary laundering centres, 
(Financial Times, Khodorkovsky "laundered $23bn" FT. February 9 2007.) with extensive links to US 
banks and the City of London. Economic & Social Research Council., Bank of New York Linked to 
Russian ‘Mafia’ via Money Laundering. Transnational Communities Programme. Oxford University. 
July 2010. 
 
368 Fisher.H.,FATF Lifts its Warning about Investment Law in Seychelles. OECD/FATF-GAFI Oct. 2000.  
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OECD/Non-OECD 
Members 
Financial Centre 
Indicated as affected 
by FATF/FSRB or 
International 
Regulation. * 
Average Real 
Growth Rate % 
(2005-2010). 
Positive/Negative 
Trends. †  
Strength of 
Alternative 
(Non-
Financial) 
Industries. †   
   
       
United Kingdom  N 1.3 ↔ S    
United States N 1.75 ↔ S    
France N 1.1↔ S    
Germany N 0.7 ↔ S    
Netherlands N 1.18↔ S    
Italy N -1.3↓ S   OECD's Largest Financial 
Centres Ranked by External 
Assets. 
Ireland N 1.6 ↓ S 
Spain N 1.8 ↓ S 
Luxembourg Y 1.9 ↓ S    
Switzerland Y 1.57 ↔ S    
Belgium N 1.3↔ W    
Japan N 2↓ S    
Australia N 2.6↑ S    
Canada N 2.2↔ S    
       
            
       
Caymans Y 1.1 ↓ W    
Singapore N 4 ↔ S    
Jersey Y Not Available.  S    
Hong Kong N 3.4 ↔ S    
Bahamas Y 0 ↓ W    
Guernsey Y 3 ↔ S  Non-OECD's Largest 
Offshore Financial Centres 
Ranked by External Assets. 
West Indies Y 0 (Average) ↓ W 
Bermuda N 5 ↑ W 
Dutch Antilles Y 1 ↑ W    
Panama Y 7.4 ↑ S    
Bahrain Y 5.7 ↑ S    
Isle of Man N 5 ↔ W    
Gibraltar N 5 ↔ W    
Barbados Y 2 ↓ W    
Mauritius Y 3.5 ↔ W    
Macao N 11.5 ↑ W    
Lebanon N 3.5 ↑ S    
Aruba Y 2.4 ↔ S    
Samoa Y 3.5 ↓ W    
Vanuatu Y 5↑ W    
       
LEGEND CODES: Y=Yes. N=No. ↑ =Growing. ↓=Falling. ↔ = Stationary. S= Strong.  W=Weak.    
* Indicated by domestic/international press, Financial Times or OECD and FATF sources.     
† From IndexMundi (http://www.indexmundi.com) , US State Department, CIA Factbook and other sources.  
       
 
Table 3: OFCs; Relationship with Regulation 
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Chapter 6: 
 
6.1: Observations. 
 
 
From a governance perspective, the two main questions to be asked are; 
who should be served by the financial apparatus of OFCs and how should such 
purposes be determined. Within the Westphalian framework envisioned by the 
UN, these questions should rightly be answered by the competences of the OFC 
jurisdiction in question. States within the OCED/FATF are stakeholders to the 
activities of OFCs, in as much as money laundering affects them, as much so as 
OCED/FATF countries are stakeholders to OFC countries, regarding the 
repercussions for OFC economies from failures within wealthier nations,  to 
control predicate offences.  The FATF represents a kind of ‘stakeholder activism’ 
through which the OECD via the FATF, seeks to create itself a ‘principal’ to 
competing economies, setting itself at the end of the agency chain as the primary 
beneficiary.  
 
In a wider context, the global anti-money laundering campaign has an 
intrinsic relationship and parallelism with the War on Drugs 369. The shape of 
money laundering as a criminal offence originates in the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988) (Vienna Convention), which created the idea of separating the underlying 
                                                 
369  Following President Nixon’s declaration of a War on Drugs June 1971. NPR Frontline Series., 
Timeline: America's War on Drugs. April 2, 2007. 
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predicate offences from the laundering the proceeds. These in turn were extended, 
to eventually result in the 40 Recommendations of the FATF 370.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Reporting Structure and Governance Chain for OFCs. 
 
 
Far from being a problem created exclusively by producer countries such as 
Afghanistan and Columbia, the drugs and narcotics trade is a response by 
criminal entrepreneurs in these countries to market demand in more developed 
countries 371.   It seems however that governments in the developed World find it 
more expedient to act against foreign governments 372 rather than seek to 
                                                 
370  Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism.Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.I-3.  
 
371 Hinterseer.K.,  Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in aComparative Legal 
Context. The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.32.  
 
372 The Mexican War on Drugs, initially prompted by US pressures, has resulted in a situation, where 
the continuation of the campaign could potentially result in the failure of the state. This has resulted 
in calls to legalise drugs in Mexico, simply to prevent the spill-over violence originating from 
traffickers, who seek mainly to smuggle drugs into the US. From Luksza.J.C., Mexico sees sense in war 
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remediate the problem domestically, either through more effective domestic 
control strategies or legalisation, which mitigates against the problem of the 
proceeds being laundered373.   
In parallel, it may be argued that jurisdictions, which implement the means 
to facilitate laundering of illicit proceeds are responding both to the supply of 
illicit funds to be laundered and the demand for the laundering of such funds. 
Moreover most funds to be laundered globally originate in OECD countries, 
which is primarily why the FATF have sought to instigate a global anti-money 
laundering infrastructure, yet nevertheless externalise money laundering controls 
to other jurisdictions, rather than concentrate domestic predicate offences.  
Notably the growing legitimacy gap of the FATF, has seemingly been filled by the 
US shift from the War on Drugs to the War on Terror 374.   
In a further parallel, the international criminalisation of money laundering 
incites more sophisticated means to legitimise illicit funds, much in the same way 
that the War on Drugs incentivises the sale and distribution of illicit substances, 
by giving extra value to the proceeds 375.  
The OCED countries collectively account for up to 75% of total World 
market capitalisation and 70% of the total World GDP 376. In terms of capacity, 
                                                                                                                                                        
on drugs; The Mexican president has finally realised that the legalisation debate could offer his country a better 
future. guardian.co.uk, Monday 23 August 2010.  Also  reported on BBC Radio 4. Sunday 29th August 
2010.  
373 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003.  Pg.43. Also discussed in Alldridge.P., 
Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.  
 
374 Williams.D., Governance, Security and ‘Development”: The Case of Money Laundering. City University 
Working Papers on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. February 2008. Pg.9. 
375  From Oscapella.E., How Drug Prohibition Finances and Otherwise Enables Terrorism. Submission to the 
Senate of Canada Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. October 2001. 
376 See Table.1. The US accounting for 50% global ( See Footnote. 323.)  sums laundered, represents 
about 35% of OECD GDP. (See Table 1) Hypothetically, even if 100% of all OECD assets held by 
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GDP, tax revenues, and financial depth and infrastructure, it is unlikely that non-
OECD countries, (other than OFCs) account for any substantial percentage of 
global funds, resultant of the proceeds of crime or laundering, particularly as the 
US alone is estimated to account for more than half of all laundered sums 377. The 
FATF nevertheless does target such countries, simply to instigate legislative 
change, possibly to preclude potential competition, if not to prevent money 
laundering.   
For lack of legitimacy, the ‘War on Money Laundering’ may well fail, much 
as the War on Drugs.  
 
6.2: Conclusions:  
 
Money Laundering, as constructed as a separate crime to its predicate 
offence, is necessitated owing to the regulatory and jurisdictional independence 
of OFCs. The progressive internationalization of the global economy, requires the 
regulation of money laundering, which can only be regulated by international 
cooperation. National measures alone shall only cause geographical shifts, which 
is why although OFCs are independent states with their own competences and 
jurisdictions, as of yet the most successful of anti-money laundering efforts rely 
on non-treaty based coercive counter-measures.  
 
The extent of globalization reduces the extent of differences between 
onshore and offshore. Financial globalisation nevertheless remains polarised 
                                                                                                                                                        
traditional non-OECD OFCs, were the proceeds of crime to be laundered through these economies, 
they would only account for an estimated maximum of 16% to 20% of all global monies laundered. If 
laundering in other OCED countries in considered, the amounts laundered by developing countries, 
which do not have OFC characteristics is probably negligible. Extrapolated from Tables 1,2 and 3. 
377  See Footnote. 323 
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towards wealthier nations. The negative effects of money laundering and indeed 
tax competition are mostly felt in the developed World. The negative effects of 
such practices on OFCs and the developing World, as suggested by the FATF etc. 
are overstated, as OFCs are merely responding to market demand for lower 
taxation, corporate flexibility and indeed venues to launder money. The idea that 
rejecting illicit funds, in favour of preserving against the entrenchment of money 
laundering and banking integrity, does not seem to actually be beneficial to the 
banking infrastructure of developing countries. This is particular, as OFCs are 
competing with laundering banks in wealthier countries. The non-blacklisting of 
FATF/OECD members, also problematically suggests that such countries are not 
accountable for laundering the proceeds of predicate offences, committed without 
of the OECD, under FATF standards. This is symptomatic of biases towards 
domestic economies and profits rather than the criminality of money laundering.  
The FATF/OECD regime, in effect seems to be geared to allow the developed 
World to take the benefits of globalisation, whilst insulating against competition 
and costs.  
 
OFCs although conducive to money laundering and other unproductive 
offshore activities, offer competition to increasingly oligopolistic banking sectors 
in the OECD, particularly as the OCED itself accounts for a large percentage of 
global laundered funds. It is also noteworthy that not all OFC activity actually 
relates to money laundering.   
 
The prevention of money laundering and terror finance, both require 
exerting control over funds originating outside the OECD, which may form the 
rationale the FATF to associate the two. Controlling terror finance in the same 
context as money laundering also allows the FATF/OECD to employ an existent 
extraterritorial infrastructure and criminal jurisdiction. It is the urgency of the 
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threat of terror, which currently allows the FATF to bridge its overall legitimacy 
gap.  
 
Terror finance (at least academically) does not adequately relate to money 
laundering, although there may be superficial technical similarities between the 
techniques of cross-border movements of funds, in both cases. The global 
homogeneity of the mechanisms and structures of the FATF are well suited to 
prevent terrorist events, however the forum of anti-money laundering is not 
adequate for such purposes. On the forum of the threat of terror, the US and the 
FATF have nevertheless hugely extended the scope of the international anti-
money laundering framework, with emphasis on homogenisation  
 
The role of the FATF and OECD seem to be inclined against the movement 
of wealth on certain bases, from developed countries to developing countries, on 
the fora of anti-money laundering, controlling terror finance and acting against 
competitive and harmful tax policies of other jurisdictions; all of which are a 
consequence of financial globalization.  The primary basis to achieve these 
objectives, however have not been to address predicate offences, domestic tax 
issues, or corporate freedom domestically, but to coercively externalize the costs of 
crime from wealthier nations to the developing world including OFCs, in parallel 
to  War on Drugs model.  Blacklisting and the instigation of FIUs etc. is generally 
ineffective for the purposes of OFCs and seem mainly to have the purpose of 
homogenising money laundering laws in developing jurisdictions to FATF 
standards.  
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6.3: Recommendations.  
 
The FATF’s legitimacy gap is founded in possible contraventions of 
International law, a democratic deficit and inconsistencies in applied standards 
with undertones of protectionism and anti-competitiveness. The FATF have 
resultantly stepped back on their blacklisting procedures, having sought 
legitimacy through the imperatives of fighting terror and from the IMF.   
It is quite commonsensical to assume that criminals should not be allowed 
to keep their wealth or benefit from their crimes 378. Money laundering inter-alia 
results in corruption, increased social costs and a loss of confidence and stability 
in the banking and financial systems and for such reasons adequate international 
controls are quite necessary.  These issues, however do not justify externalizing 
the costs of crime from wealthier nations to the developing world including OFCs. 
FATF and OECD members should remove their own propensity to launder money 
and harmful tax regimes before demanding anything of other jurisdictions. It 
seems that the ‘all crimes’ model for defining predicate offences, is unnecessary 
and unjust.  Local decriminalisation of more minor predicate offences or more 
effective mechanisms (such as handling) to address them would be more efficient.  
 
To viably bridge the legitimacy gap, a more liberal, cooperative and 
multilateral approach is necessary, taking all stake-holding parties, including 
OFCs and their sovereignty into account, if it is indeed the purpose of the 
FATF/OCED to prevent money laundering. More practically, the top-heavy model 
of international regulation is impeded by the inability of regulators to monitor 
compliance or enforce regulation internationally and is ineffective and prejudicial 
having no effect on the ‘costs and benefits’ of regulating states. A more 
multilateral approach is more practicable and economical.  
                                                 
378 The dicta of Lord Wolf CJ in R v Sekton [2003] 1WLR 1655. 
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Stricter requirements for client information, with preclusion from access to 
the market for failing to do so, has been identified as a basis to respect OFC 
sovereignty and also protect from money laundering 379. This possibly may be 
unviable owing to the symbioses of OFCs, with both the legitimate and 
illegitimate economies, 
Another possibility is an increased concentration upon the prevention of 
predicate offences, or reducing the viability of such offences through legalisation, 
as suggested by some commentators 380. Such measures may only however have 
any relevance to funds resultant of drugs and narcotic offences.   
A third possibility is a basis by which, the value derivative of laundered 
money is distributed between the jurisdiction of the predicate offence and the 
jurisdiction processing the money. This may on the one hand, take the form of the 
FATF instituting a regime of domestic bank charges within its member states, 
based upon the risk of money being transferred to their jurisdictions, being 
derivative of criminal acts. Alternatively or simultaneously, employing the 
existent ‘know your customer’ principles, OFCs upon identifying the source of 
money transfers to their jurisdiction can withhold a levy on funds, which 
demonstrate the risk of being the proceeds of crimes, and remit these back to the 
jurisdiction the funds originated from.  OFCs would be incentivised to do so as 
they would not need to divulge the identity of their customer and would benefit 
from some partial decriminalisation of the offence of money laundering.  This 
approach is viable, as it detracts from lapses in preventing predicate offences, for 
the purposes of the originating jurisdiction, and provides that jurisdiction with at 
least a percentage of the untaxed monies through reintegration of funds from the 
                                                 
379 Doyle.T., Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate 
international law. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002.  Pg.13. 
380 Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003.  Pg.43. Also discussed in Alldridge.P., 
Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. 
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illicit to the licit economy. The OFC can retain its bank secrecy, as well as retain a 
percentage of the transferred funds.   
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